Defying the odds: Understanding the critical success factors for financing independent powers producers in Zimbabwe by Zunguze, Timisela
  
 
 
Defying The Odds: Understanding the Critical Success 
Factors for Financing Independent Power Producers in 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
A Thesis  
presented to 
 
The Graduate School of Business 
University of Cape Town 
 
In partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the 
Master of Commerce in Development Finance Degree 
 
by 
Timisela Zunguze 
December 2016 
 
Supervised by: Professor Anton Eberhard 
Co supervisor: Wikus Kruger 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
i 
1! PLAGIARISM DECLARATION 
I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another’s work and pretend that it is 
one’s own.  
I have used the APA convention for citation and referencing. Each contribution to, and 
quotation in, this thesis from the work(s) of other people has been attributed, and has been 
cited and referenced.  
This thesis is my own work. 
I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention of passing 
it off as his or her own work.  
I acknowledge that copying someone else’s assignment or essay, or part of it, is wrong, and 
declare that this is my own work.  
Signature: 
Name: Timisela Zunguze 
Date: 4 December 2016 
 ii 
 
2! ABSTRACT 
 
Since the introduction of legislation in Zimbabwe allowing private participation in 
generation, there has been significant investor interest in financing independent power 
producers (IPPs). However, this interest has not materialized into actual investment. Of the 
29 IPPs licensed by the Zimbabwe Regulatory Authority (ZERA), only eleven have reached 
financial closure and are supplying the grid. This dismal performance in the IPP space is a 
major concern for policy makers, particularly in light of the persistent power shortages 
plaguing the country. Stop gap measures such as the imports of power and load shedding are 
not sustainable and have detrimental effects on economic productivity. Expansion of private 
power generation is the only viable long term solution. In light of this, it is imperative to 
understand the factors that contribute towards successfully financing IPPs.  
 
The purpose of this study is to explore and identify the critical success factors (CSFs) for 
financing IPPs in Zimbabwe and specific strategies to improve the implementation of IPPs, to 
ensure as far as possible, a win-win scenario for all stakeholders. This thesis employs a mixed 
methods approach consisting of a qualitative first phase of expert interviews to identify a core 
list of success factors, followed by a quantitative second phase, in which a questionnaire 
survey is used to examine the relative importance and ranking of the factors and to determine 
whether the ranking of factors varies by stakeholder grouping. 
 
A total of 40 success factors were identified, and 38 of the 40 were rated as critical for 
financing IPPs in Zimbabwe by stakeholders. The study also revealed that the expected debt 
paying ability of the project; a transparent and cost reflective tariff framework and upholding 
of contracts are the most critical factors for all stakeholders. The results indicated that there 
is low agreement in the the ranking of CSFs between the private sector and public sector. 
 
This study provides a valuable reference for all stakeholders that are interested in developing 
IPPs in Zimbabwe. 
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6! GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
 
Critical Success Factor A critical success factor is a key factor in which 
success is necessary (Smith & Walker, 1994) or 
an area, in which things must be implemented 
right in order for a project to flourish and for 
each major stakeholders’ goals to be achieved 
(Bullen & Rockart, 1981).  
 
Successful investment outcome We adopt for this study the definition of success 
adopted by Victor at al (2004) in their study of 
IPP experiences in developing countries. A 
successful investment outcome is one in which a 
project meets the investors’ expectations at the 
time financial commitment is made. 
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1! INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1! Research Area and Background 
 
Despite a strong economic recovery between 2009 and 2014, economic headwinds in Zimbabwe 
are threatening to slow down progress gained since the introduction of dollarization and other 
stabilization measures (World Bank [WB], 2016). Like the other countries in the SADC region, 
Zimbabwe is facing significant energy challenges that are crippling economic development 
(Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century [REN21], 2015). The country’s 
existing power generation assets, most of which were built and commissioned between 1940 and 
1970 (Zimbabwe Power Company [ZPC], 2016), have reached the end of their economic life 
and urgently need to be replaced (Pushak & Briceño-Garmendia, 2011;!Ringskog, 2013). The 
Government of Zimbabwe, through the power generation utility Zimbabwe Power Company 
(ZPC), has embarked on a refurbishment and expansion strategy to improve the country’s power 
generation capacity, notably, amongst others, the 300 MW Kariba South Extension Project and 
the refurbishment of the 600 MW Hwange Thermal Power Station (ZPC, 2016). However, 
progress on these and the other expansion projects by the Government has been painstakingly 
slow. The development of the Kariba South Project, for example, began in late 2011 but 
financial close was only reached three years later in late 2014. To meet the current capacity 
demand shortfall, the country regularly imports power from neighbouring countries South 
Africa and Zambia, but this is not sustainable given the state utility Zesa Holdings’ precarious 
financial position (Pushak & Briceño-Garmendia, 2011). Such delays, coupled with the 
prevalence of drought in the region, necessitate the development of independent power 
producers (IPPs), to augment supply and plug the power supply gap. Energy security is 
fundamental to maintaining the momentum of Zimbabwe’s economic recovery, resuscitation of 
industry and job creation. IPPs will play an integral part in the energy mix of the country and 
securing power generation stability. Hence, a consideration of the IPP experience in Zimbabwe 
and what factors are critical for securing investment and the successful implementation of IPPs 
presents an opportunity to address the country’s power challenges. 
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There is a growing body of literature focused on identifying the underlying success factors for 
the financing and implementation of IPPs.  This literature has emerged out of the realisation that 
in most developing countries, public finances have been unable meet the investment required for 
power generation and transmission (Eberhard, Gratwick, Morella & Antmann, 2016). Private 
sector participation, predominantly through IPPs, is needed to bridge the funding gap (Eberhard 
et al., 2016). Eberhard & Gratwick (2011) analysed the outcomes of 20 IPP projects across 
Africa and identified a set of factors that play a critical role in determining IPP success. Their 
study is unique in that the factors were identified directly from the observed outcomes of 
specific projects, whereas the majority of other studies relied predominantly on literature to 
generate their list of factors. They find that a favourable investment climate, clear policy and 
regulatory frameworks, favourable equity arrangements, the origin, experience and mandate of 
partners, credit enhancements and security arrangements are some of the factors that are critical 
to the success of an IPP (Eberhard & Gratwick, 2011). Other studies have used the critical 
success factor methodology to identify and rank the most important success factors for IPPs 
(Qiao, Wang, Tiong, & Chan, 2001; Chowdury & Charoenngam, 2008; Zhao, Zuo, Zillante, & 
Wang, 2010; Gupta, Gupta, & Agrawal, 2013). Their findings are consistent with those of 
Eberhard & Gratwick (2011) except that they use different factor groupings such as by phase of 
development (Qiao et al., 2001), project attributes (Gupta et al., 2013) and in the case of Zhao et 
al. (2010), a comparative analysis of success factors of IPPs by fuel type. 
 
A key insight from the study by Eberhard & Gratwick (2011) and also one of the primary 
motivations for this research, is that the success of investment in IPPs is strongly influenced by 
the national context of the country in which the investment occurs. This implies any strategies to 
increase investment have to be adapted or tailored to fit the local context. The Program on 
Energy and Sustainable Development at Stanford University (PSED) in collaboration with the 
Management Program in Infrastructure Reform & Regulation at the University of Cape Town 
(MIIRR) conducted an in depth study of the experiences of IPPs in 13 developing countries 
(Victor, Heller, House, & Woo, 2004; Woodhouse, 2005), in order to identify the major factors 
that explain the variation in IPP outcomes across countries. The authors employed a two-step 
research protocol (Victor et al., 2004) that is instructive in how a study to explore the IPP 
experience of a country can be conducted. The first step in the research protocol entailed an 
identification of major hypotheses or independent variables that explain IPP outcomes from 
existing literature and key stakeholders (Victor et al., 2004). In the second step, they then 
studied specific countries and projects to “test whether (and under what conditions)” (Victor et 
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al., 2004, p. 7), the factors identified in step one actually explained the observed IPP outcomes. 
Their method of enquiry was qualitative and used in- depth interviews with key stakeholders to 
generate key insights. 
 
Although studies have been conducted to explore the success factors of IPPs in other African 
developing countries (Eberhard & Gratwick, 2011; Eberhard et al., 2016) there has been no 
research to date on the success factors for IPPs in Zimbabwe and very limited research on the 
experience of IPPs in Zimbabwe in general. This study will be useful in not only helping to fill 
this gap but also adding to the body of knowledge of the experience of IPPs globally and to the 
literature on the determinants for success for IPP investment in developing countries. 
Additionally, while empirical studies on the critical success factors for IPPs in developing   
countries have identified a comprehensive list of factors, these factors are not necessarily 
generalizable to all developing countries, because there is no uniformity in the political, social 
and macroeconomic contexts across countries. This research aims to strengthen the theoretical 
frameworks underpinning the literature on the success factors for IPPs by testing these theories 
in the Zimbabwean context and providing empirical evidence to support or reject the factors 
identified in previous studies. Importantly, this research will also provide useful insights for 
policy makers, developers and investors involved in the IPP sector in Zimbabwe 
 
1.2! Problem Statement 
 
Since the introduction of the Electricity Act, Chapter 13:19 in 2002, that liberalised Zimbabwe’s 
power sector and facilitated the entrance of private players in electricity generation (Zimbabwe 
Electricity Act, 2002), the total number of IPPs that have reached financial closure and are now 
in operation is disappointing (African Development Bank [AFDB], 2011; Ringskog, 2013). As 
of October 2016, Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA), the government body 
responsible for licensing IPPs, had issued a total of 29 generation licenses to IPPs since 2003. 
However only nine of those IPPs are operational (Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority 
[ZERA], 2016a), which is roughly a 31 percent rate of realised investment. This dismal 
performance in the IPP space is a major concern for policy makers, especially in light of the 
persistent power challenges plaguing the country. Stop-gap measures such as the import of 
power from neighbouring countries are not sustainable. Expansion in private generation is the 
only viable long-term solution for the country. 
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Multiple reasons have been cited for the low investment success rate amongst IPPs. ZERA 
attributes the lacklustre performance of IPPs mainly to the severe liquidity challenges being 
experienced in the country and a lack of access to funding for project preparation by IPPs 
(“Zera licenses,” 2016). Ringskog (2013) points out that the challenges IPPs are facing in 
closing financing are in part due to the large arrears the country owes to international 
financing institutions blocking the flow of new capital. Although these reasons are valid, a 
complete understanding of the problem requires an in-depth look at the experiences of IPPs 
in Zimbabwe. Firstly, to understand what factors explain why investment has been so low in 
IPPs and secondly, to identify the key areas that need to be addressed to increase the rate of 
successful financings of IPPs. 
 
1.3! Purpose and Significance of the Research 
 
The purpose of this research is an exploratory study to determine and understand what the 
critical success factors are for financing IPPs in Zimbabwe. Firstly, it will test qualitatively, 
whether the major hypotheses given in literature for the variation in IPP outcomes across 
countries explains the observed low investment rate in IPPs in Zimbabwe in order to orient 
the investigation of critical success factors. Secondly, it will identify through interviews, the 
critical success factors for financing IPPs in Zimbabwe and through a questionnaire 
instrument, identify which factors are most critical. These critical success factors will be used 
to develop recommendations and strategies to ensure successful IPP development.  
 
This study is significant because it will add to the body of knowledge on IPP experiences and 
critical factors for success by studying the specific country and project level factors for 
financing IPPs in Zimbabwe. As the first study on IPPs in Zimbabwe to my knowledge, it 
will also provide a basis from which further research on IPPs in Zimbabwe can be done.  
For IPP developers and other stakeholders, this study will provide useful information and 
insights that could potentially provide solutions to financing and implementation challenges 
they may be facing, allowing the successful completion of their projects. For policymakers, 
this study will offer insights into what conditions are necessary to promote the proliferation 
of IPPs and identify areas which require adjustment or concentration of policy efforts in order 
to increase investment in IPPs. For the country, this study will offer insights into how to 
improve the low investment rate in IPPs in Zimbabwe in order to increase the number of IPPs 
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that are operational in the country, which would result in the delivery of much needed 
generation capacity to aid economic development. 
 
1.4! Research Questions and Scope 
 
The study aims to answer the following research questions: 
 
Research Question 1  
 
What are the critical success factors for financing IPPs in Zimbabwe?  
 
Research Question 2  
 
What is the ranking of the critical success factors for financing IPPs in Zimbabwe and does 
this ranking vary by stakeholder grouping? 
 
Research Question 3 
 
What strategies can be employed to improve the implementation of IPPs in Zimbabwe in order 
to increase the number of IPPs that reach financial closure 
 
Research Objectives  
 
The objectives of the study are to  
•! To identify what the critical success factors are for financing IPPs in Zimbabwe 
•! To determine the ranking of the critical success factors for financing IPPs in Zimbabwe  
•! To explorewhether the ranking of the critical success factors varies by stakeholder 
grouping 
•! To identify strategies that can be employed to improve the implementation of IPPs in 
in order to increase the number of IPPs that reach financial closure? 
 
Scope 
 
This study focuses on the experience of IPPs in Zimbabwe from 2003, the year private 
participation in generation was enacted, to date. The stricter definition of of an IPP as a 
purely private owned electricity producer is applied for this study as there are currently no 
public private partnerships in electricity generation in Zimbabwe. By law, in order to develop 
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an independent power project in Zimbabwe, a developer must first be licensed by ZERA. 
Therefore, this study will look at the experiences of all licensed IPPs in Zimbabwe, both 
those that have reached financial closure and those that are yet to.   
 
1.5! Summary  
 
This chapter has shown that IPPs play an important role in the provision of much needed 
power generation in developing countries and how the specific national context in which 
investment occurs is critical in determining the success of IPPs. It has also shown that this 
study will help fill the gap in literature on the experience and success factors of IPPs in 
Zimbabwe. This report will be structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive 
literature review on the drivers, mechanisms and barriers of energy infrastructure investment 
and empirical literature on the experiences of IPPs in developing countries to establish the 
conceptual framework for the investigation. Chapter 3 will describe the research 
methodology utilised in this study. Chapters 4 and 5 will present the research findings of the 
qualitative and quantitative phases of the research. Chapter 6 synthesises and discusses the 
findings in the previous chapters and provides conclusions based on those findings. Chapter 7 
will give conclusions to the study and provide recommendations for future research.  
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2! LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1! Introduction 
!
Understanding the critical success factors for investment in IPPs in Zimbabwe can be likened 
to solving a jigsaw puzzle, where each factor is a unique piece of the puzzle that fits together 
with the other “pieces” (factors) to complete the puzzle (successful IPP investment). 
Understanding what influences and ultimately determines an investor’s final decision to 
invest or not invest is the natural starting point in identifying which specific pieces or factors 
are necessary to solve the puzzle. Investment theory and evidence from empirical studies on 
barriers to investment provide useful insights in this regard. However, an understanding of 
the factors that shape investors’ investment decisions only solves half of the puzzle and does 
not comprehensively explain why some countries have more success in attracting investment 
for IPPs than others. Varying investment success rates across countries underscore the 
importance of the characteristics of the environment in which investment is made on final 
investment outcomes.  Therefore, an understanding of what constitutes an enabling 
environment for IPP investment essentially completes the puzzle.  
 
This literature review begins with a discussion on the salient characteristics of energy 
infrastructure investments and how those features influence the decision to invest.  A 
discussion of relevant investment theory, its predictions regarding infrastructure investment 
and key barriers to private investment then follows. Next, the benefits of project finance as a 
mechanism for financing energy infrastructure and the importance of risk identification and 
mitigation are discussed and the definition and main characteristics of IPPs. The next section 
involves a survey of existing empirical literature on success factors for IPPs and in particular 
we focus on the findings of the Management Program in Infrastructure Reform & Regulation 
at the University of Cape Town (MIR) of the experiences of IPPs in Sub Saharan Africa as a 
framework or lens through which this study’s empirical investigation into critical success 
factors for IPPs in Zimbabwe may be guided. The final section presents a description of IPPs 
and the energy sector in Zimbabwe to give context for this study. 
 
2.2! Economic and Financial Characteristics of Energy Infrastructure 
 
Energy infrastructure investments have unique characteristics that distinguish them from 
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other types of investments (Ehlers, 2014). It is also these distinguishing characteristics that 
make matching energy infrastructure investment demand and the supply of finance difficult 
(Ehlers, 2014). Beeferman & Wain (2015) point out that these characteristics result in unique 
economic, political and financial arrangements for infrastructure that are not made for other 
types of investments (Beeferman & Wain, 2015). Although there is a wide array of opinions 
amongst investors on what constitutes the most salient characteristics of energy infrastructure 
investments (Beeferman & Wain, 2015), only those characteristics most cited in literature 
and relevant for IPPs, will be discussed. 
 
Arguably, the most distinctive characteristic of energy infrastructure is its illiquidity. 
Infrastructure projects like power plants are illiquid because they are indivisible, cannot be 
converted to another use without significant cost and cannot easily be sold because there is no 
secondary market for such infrastructure. A second characteristic of energy infrastructure 
builds is that they are capital intensive, with a substantial portion of the total capital outlay 
for a build required at the beginning of the project. The construction period for infrastructure 
can also be quite long, often spanning a number of years in which no cash flows are 
generated. Any major disruptions during construction can have disastrous effects on an 
investor’s ability to recover the full cost of their investment, let alone make returns. Another 
feature of infrastructure projects is the involvement of multiple stakeholders in project 
implementation. The interaction of these stakeholders is managed through extensive 
contractual arrangements between all the parties. Finally, energy projects tend to be highly 
scrutinized by both government and the general public, because of the social welfare 
implications of electricity provision. This makes these projects susceptible to undue political 
interference (Ehlers, 2014, Beeferman & Wain, 2015). 
 
The characteristics mentioned above, and in particular the time gap in the outlay of capital 
and generation of cash flows, results in energy infrastructure investments having 
considerably higher risk and uncertainty than other types of investment. To compensate for 
this, investors normally demand a premium for investing in energy infrastructure (Ehlers, 
2014). When the investment is being made in a developing country context like Zimbabwe, 
the level of risk and uncertainty is heightened, which can negatively impact the investor’s 
decision to invest unless other mitigating conditions are present. 
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2.3! Investment under Uncertainty, Irreversibility and Real Options 
 
Investment theory is the body of knowledge on investment decision making 
(Goetzmann,1996). Within investment theory, the theory of irreversible investment under 
uncertainty and real options theory are the most pertinent for investment in infrastructure and 
make predictions that shed some light on the low observed investment rate for IPPs in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
The standard business fixed investment model is the neoclassical theory of investment 
(Mankiw, 2015) developed by Jorgenson (1963). The model’s basic premise is that 
investment occurs whenever the present value of the expected returns to an investment 
exceed the initial capital outlay (Gordon, 1992) that is, investment occurs when the net 
present value or NPV is positive. In relation to long-lived fixed capital investment like energy 
infrastructure, the model assumes a completely risk neutral environment and perfect resale 
markets (Gordon, 1992; Crotty, 1993). This makes any investor uncertainty about the future 
irrelevant to the investment decision and investment mistakes costless (Crotty, 1993).  
Combining these assumptions of risk neutrality and reversible investment, the neoclassical 
model predicts that as long as the NPV of a project is positive, investment will certainly 
occur. 
 
Empirical evidence has shown this prediction to be false as the NPV rule has failed to predict 
with certainty which projects will be undertaken (Anderson, 2013; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994) 
This is because the NPV rule fails to take into account two key elements of the real 
investment experience: specifically, the effect of uncertainty and irreversibility on 
investment. Anderson (2013) points out that a fundamental weakness in the NPV rule is that 
it ignores the value of the option to wait, when the ability to wait to make a decision is an 
integral part of business, financial markets and real markets. As a consequence, extensive 
literature emerged in the 80’s towards developing a more realistic theory of investment. 
 
2.3.1! Investment Under Uncertainty and The Irreversibility Effect 
The effect of irreversibility on investment under uncertainty was first studied by McDonald 
and Siegel (1986). Long term infrastructure projects like IPPs are irreversible. A project is 
economically irreversible if once it has been implemented, it cannot be “undone” or 
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converted to another use without significantly high costs or the scope for alternative use of 
that project is extremely limited (Claude, 1974; Bernanke, 1983). Because disinvestment is 
not possible, any expenditures made are unrecoverable sunk costs (Pindyck, 1988). The 
future prospects and profitability of long term projects is highly uncertain at the time the 
decision to invest is being considered. As a result of this uncertainty, there is value in 
postponing the investment until more information is known, to safeguard against loss. On the 
other hand, there are potential gains to early commitment to the project, particularly if future 
conditions turn out to be favorable. This creates a tradeoff for investors between the potential 
gains from early commitment and delaying investment (Bernanke, 1983; McDonald & 
Siegel, 1986; Pindyck, 1991; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). 
Assuming all investors are rational and risk averse, an investor would forego the potential 
gains from early commitment and choose to delay investment until they acquire more 
information about future prospects. Thus theory predicts that uncertainty will have a negative 
impact on irreversible investment (McDonald & Siegel, 1986; Pindyck, 1991; Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1994; Baddeley, 2002). The length of time the investment is delayed, known as “the 
optimal waiting period”, will depend upon the quality and precision of information about the 
future potential of the investment that is subsequently received (Cukierman, 1980).  
2.3.2! Real Options Theory of Investment  
Pindyck (1991), in his seminal paper, “Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Investment”, was the 
first to highlight that investment opportunities have option-like characteristics that enable 
optimal investment rules to be derived from existing methods of option pricing (Pindyck, 
1991). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) later conceptualised modeling investment as real options, 
where like a financial call option, the investment decision is the right but not the obligation to 
invest. They argue that once an investment can be postponed, the standard NPV rule no 
longer applies (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994), because the value of the option to invest is no longer 
solely the net present value of the investment but the opportunity costs of making the 
investment should also be factored in the option value calculation. The opportunity costs of 
investing are the benefits foregone by not taking the opportunity to wait and collect new 
information on the investment’s future prospects before investing (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; 
Baddeley, 2002). This theory predicts investment will only occur if the value of the option to 
invest exceeds the required initial capital outlay (sunk costs) plus the benefits foregone by not 
delaying investment (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Baddeley, 2002). They motivate that under 
 18 
 
uncertainty the value of additional information about future prospects increases when the 
investment to be made involves large sunk costs. An investor therefore will prefer to delay an 
irreversible investment when faced with high uncertainty. 
Empirically, there is evidence in support of the negative impact of uncertainty on irreversible 
infrastructure investment. Dunne & Mu (2001), using a commodity futures construct as a 
proxy for uncertainty, found that an increase in uncertainty reduced the probability of 
investment in additional capacity by petroleum refineries in the United States (Dunne & Mu, 
2001). Doan and Menyah (2013) undertook a case study investigation on the impact of 
irreversibility and uncertainty on the timing of a BOT toll road project. The results of their 
study showed that postponement of the project for a few years made the project viable. They 
found that if the investment had not been delayed, the project would not have been viable 
(Doan & Menyah, 2013). This evidence underscores the importance of strategies and 
incentives that reduce uncertainty in order to improve investment rates in irreversible projects 
like IPPs. 
Sources of uncertainty include the macro environment, the political systems and the 
regulatory environment. Therefore, investment theory predicts that in the absence of 
mitigating factors, investment in IPPs will be delayed until more information is known. This 
study seeks to identify how uncertainty and risk have impacted IPP investment in Zimbabwe 
and to identify key success factors to effectively de-risk IPP investment, to increase the 
number of IPPs that are successfully financed. 
 
2.4! Barriers and challenges to private financing of infrastructure  
!
There is a wealth of empirical and practitioner literature that details the specific challenges 
and barriers to private financing of infrastructure. These barriers include the level of political 
stability, governance, weak legal and regulatory environments, macroeconomic stability and 
underdeveloped financial markets (WB, 2013; Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
[CEPA], 2015; World Economic Forum & Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development [WEF & OECD], 2015). For energy infrastructure investment, the level of 
political stability and the nature of the legal and regulatory regimes are particularly important 
to investors. In a survey of investors conducted by Allen & Overy (2009), over 90 percent of 
respondents cited the attractiveness of the regulatory environment and the presence of robust 
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rule of law as very important factors in their choice of countries as investment destinations. 
The World Bank (2004) found that obstacles in relation to policies, institutions, and 
regulation are the major bottlenecks to private financing. This is because the complex 
contractual arrangements and long gestation periods of infrastructure projects necessitate a 
stable, transparent and predictable political and regulatory environment, to ensure full cost 
recovery and safeguard investment returns (WB, 2013).  
Another critical barrier to private investment in developing countries often cited in literature 
is the lack of bankable projects (WB, 2013; CEPA, 2015). This is primarily the result of 
insufficient financial and technical resources in project preparation (MDB Working Group 
[MDB], 2011; WB, 2013). Good project preparation entails detailed economic, financial and 
technical feasibility studies (MDB, 2011) and for greenfield projects like IPPs, legal or 
guarantee frameworks are also required to sufficiently de-risk the project for potential 
investors (WEF & OECD, 2015). It is argued that development finance institutions can play a 
critical role in increasing the pipeline of bankable projects by giving financial and technical 
assistance to developing countries at the project preparation stage (International Finance 
Corporation, 2011). 
Another important barrier to investment is that project returns to infrastructure in developing 
countries are perceived as too low and not commensurate to the level of risk being 
undertaken (WB, 2013; WEF & OECD, 2015). This is particularly pertinent for IPPs and 
other energy infrastructure projects, because electricity provision is highly politicized and the 
electricity tariffs charged by state utilities are in most cases below cost and controlled by 
government in the interests of maintaining affordability (WEF & OECD, 2015). The result is 
that for private power projects, which entail inherently higher investment risk, existing tariffs 
do not adequately cover project costs (WB, 2013), making projects unattractive from a cost 
recovery and risk return perspective.  
Another important barrier to financing, which can easily be overlooked, is that in many cases 
private investors lack sufficient knowledge about the social, legal and political environment 
of the countries they invest in (WEF & OECD, 2015). A lack of sufficient market data, sector 
specific expertise and an in-depth understanding of local business practices (WEF & OECD, 
2015), often prevent investors from accurately assessing the cost of investment and probable 
risks when making investment decisions. This can result in a disastrous investment 
experience or the decision to not invest at all. There is a very little literature or market data on 
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Zimbabwe and the investment experiences of investors in Zimbabwe, across all sectors. This 
study seeks to help fill this gap by providing information regarding sector specific policies, 
business and investment practices relevant for investment in IPPs in Zimbabwe. This 
information could be used to create a type of investment primer about investing in the 
electricity sector in Zimbabwe, which could be very useful for potential investors. 
CEPA (2015) conducted a systematic review of literature on the barriers and challenges to 
private financing of infrastructure projects, including energy, in Sub Saharan Africa and 
South Asia. As part of their review, they identify that one of the gaps in existing literature on 
financing constraints is the absence of studies which focus on specific factors that have the 
most critical impact on securing private finance and will facilitate well timed and focused 
policy interventions to increase private investment in infrastructure. This study will 
contribute to filling this gap. 
The impact of the issues highlighted in this section is that they individually and collectively 
increase the overall uncertainty and risk of infrastructure investment. As discussed in the 
preceding sections on investment theory, the impact of higher uncertainty surrounding an 
investment is a longer optimal waiting period before investment is made. This underscores 
the central role of risk and risk mitigation in determining investment outcomes. In the next 
section we discuss the importance of risk mitigation and project finance in relation to energy 
infrastructure investment. 
 
2.5! Project finance and risk mitigation for energy infrastructure investment 
!
2.5.1! The benefits of project finance  
!
The use of project finance to finance energy infrastructure projects in countries characterised 
by high political risk and weak institutional and legal systems has grown in popularity with 
financial investors (Hainz & Kleimeier, 2012). This is mainly because of three key features 
of project finance. Firstly, project finance enables the power project to be implemented 
through a newly created special purpose vehicle. The establishment of a separate SPV with a 
distinct legal personality allows the sponsoring company to raise financing for a project 
without increasing its debt burden (Finnerty, 2007) and gives the providers of finance 
protection should the sponsors face financial distress or bankruptcy, by isolating the project 
from financial risk contamination (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). This cover is particularly 
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pertinent in developing countries like Zimbabwe where there is significant macroeconomic 
risk and financial market instability. Secondly, project finance is limited recourse or off 
balance sheet financing, which limits the legal liability of the sponsors in the event that the 
underlying project fails (Finnerty, 2007). The lenders’ sole recourse is to the assets of the 
project company. This is important because it enables viable projects to be financed almost 
entirely on merit and not on the strength of the sponsors balance sheets, as most developers 
do not have the financial muscle to fund project on their own balance sheet. Finally, project 
finance consists of an extensive network of contracts that govern the behaviour of all the 
parties involved in the project and are critical to aligning incentives and coordinating 
activities, responsibilities and risk (Esty, 2002; Sorge, 2004; Finnerty, 2007). In particular, 
the non-financial contracts that make up part of the suite of project finance arrangements are 
an important risk management tool that enables project sponsors for IPPs to borrow funds at 
an affordable rate (Corielli, Gatti, & Steffanoni, 2010). Figure 1 below shows the contractual 
arrangements involved in a typical project financing of an independent power project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reprinted from The Green Climate Fund and private finance: Instruments to mobilise 
investment in climate change mitigation projects by S. Gray and N. Tatrallyay, p. 8. Copyright 2012 
by Climate Change Capital Ltd. !
 
2.5.2! The Importance of Risk and Risk Mitigation  
Most IPP projects are greenfield, with no prior operating history at the time of initial 
investment making, making them risky investments for investors (Finnerty, 2007). The 
creditworthiness of the project to a financial investor depends not only on profitability from a 
Figure 1: Typical Project Finance Structure for an IPP 
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cash flow perspective, but also the sustainability of cash flows. Sustainability refers to the 
management and mitigation of the long-term risks to project revenues. A balance between 
profitability and sustainability is essentially what is referred to as “bankability” in the 
analysis of a project by investors. For lenders, in particular, bankability means two things: 
first, that their returns, which are typically capped in nature, should be sufficient to offset the 
long-term risks of the project in light of the revenue stream; and secondly that the overall 
elements of the deal add up to one that is sustainable with a minimal likelihood of default.  
Bankability is of particular concern for investors in developing countries because of the 
higher risks inherent to those countries. For projects in Africa, the typical expected rates of 
return for equity are between 15% and 20% to compensate for those higher risks (WB, 1994). 
For Sub-Saharan African countries like Zimbabwe, a key requirement to attract private 
investment to the power sector is the availability of risk mitigation instruments (Eberhard, 
Gratwick, Morella & Antmann, 2016). Risk identification, allocation, management and 
mitigation are at the core of project finance. Bonetti, Caselli and Gatti (2010) emphasize that 
the utility and success of project finance hinges greatly on the accurate identification of risks 
relevant to a project and in structuring the contractual arrangements such that protection from 
those risks is airtight. It is rare for projects to be financed entirely on their own merit without 
any guarantees or form of sponsor support (Roberts,1983). Nevitt and Fabozzi (1995) point 
out that the key to creating a project financing transaction that satisfies the lenders from a risk 
perspective is to structure the project such that it has as little recourse to the project sponsors 
but still provides credit support for lenders through guarantees and a government undertaking 
of support. However, the specific level of recourse required by lenders is determined by the 
type and magnitude of risks inherent in the project (Badissy, 2014). 
Eberhard et al. (2016) point out that risk mitigation techniques need to be tailored to the 
country in which the investment is being made, as well as the sector specific characteristics. 
This underscores the relevance of this study in identifying the key risks to investment in IPPs 
in Zimbabwe, in order to tailor risk mitigation strategies for the specific context of IPPs in 
Zimbabwe.   
2.6! Definition and Characteristics of IPPs 
 
The term independent power producer, abbreviated as IPP, originated in the United States, 
who were the pioneers of electricity generation by independent merchant power plant 
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operators (Jechoutek & Lamech, 1995). Besant–Jones (2006) defines an IPP as “an entity that 
owns facilities to generate electric power for sale to utilities and end users and that has no 
affiliation to a transmission or distribution company” (Besant-Jones, 2006, p.130). This 
definition explains the function of an IPP but gives no clarity on the ownership of the IPP. 
Traditionally, the defining characteristic of an IPP is generally understood to be private 
ownership and independence from government. Eberhard et al. (2016) adopt a broader 
definition of IPPs, pointing out that in practice, the ownership structures of IPPs are not 
uniformly private. In Sub-Saharan Africa, some IPPs are in the form of public private 
partnerships (Eberhard et al., 2016). However, for the purposes of this study, the stricter 
definition of purely private ownership will be applied.  
 
IPPs can either be greenfield of brownfield projects (WB, 2016a). A greenfield project is the 
implementation of an entirely new power plant. A brownfield project is the expansion or 
rehabilitation of an existing plant. The World Bank PPI Database (WB, 2016a) classifies 
greenfield projects involving the participation of the private sector by the type of contract 
used to implement the project. The three most common project structures are Build-Own-
Operate (BOO), Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) and Build-Lease-Transfer (BOO). For 
the purposes of this study, only greenfield, BOO IPPs will be considered.  
!
The sale of electric power by an IPP to the offtaker, typically a state owned utility, is 
achieved through a long-term power purchase agreement (PPA). The typical length of the 
PPA term is between 15 and 20 years (Woolf & Halpern, 2001), giving some measure of 
reliability of income to the IPP. The PPA is the central agreement around which the financing 
of an IPP occurs as it is from the stream of revenues that accrue to the IPP under the PPA that 
investors, both debt and equity, will realise a financial return. 
 
2.6.1! Potential Benefits of IPPs  
!
An understanding of the CSFs to promote the development of IPPs is important because IPPs 
can provide many benefits for the host countries. Several benefits associated with IPPs are 
given in literature. The table below presents some of the major benefits of IPPs highlighted in 
literature 
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Table 1: Benefits of IPPs 
 
 
However, with regard to the benefit of reduced electricity prices, in reality, IPPs do not have 
competitive tariffs, because electricity tariffs charged by utilities are in most cases pegged far 
below cost and politically controlled due to social welfare considerations and priorities of the 
government (WB, 2013; WEF & OECD,2015).  
 
2.6.2! Criticism and Potential Pitfalls of IPPs 
 
Despite the many potential benefits of IPPs, many countries that have introduced private 
generation have run into significant challenges with IPPs (Hall & Bayliss, 2000). Hall & 
Bayliss (2000) conducted a review of the major problems that have arisen with IPPs in 
different countries. Some of these challenges highlighted are protracted political and 
economic battles over IPPs, protracted legal battles with IPPs, unduly favourable conditions 
offered to IPPs and the crippling of state utilities due to heavy payment obligations to IPPs 
(Hall & Bayliss, 2000). These challenges are largely attributable to corruption, the structure 
of the PPA, and the offtake arrangements available in a country. A major challenge with 
IPPs, particularly for the offtaker and government, is that the structure of the PPA structure is 
too rigid and does not promote sustained efficiency gains or promote competitive markets 
(Woolf & Halpern, 2001). The nature of the contract effectively locks in the contract terms, 
financing and security arrangements made at the inception of the contract for as long as 25 
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years, such that even if advancements in generation lead to cheaper power alternatives, the 
offtaker is obligated to purchase the now more expensive power secured under the PPA. 
Another major concern is the strain that cumulative obligations to buy power from IPPs 
places on the offtaker in a single buyer market (Besant- Jones, 2006). A challenge with IPPs 
that is pertinent to African electricity markets is corruption. Kashi (2015) found that in less 
developed countries, IPPs often overstate their investment costs to increase the returns on 
funds utilised, in order to offset the higher risks associated with greenfield projects. This 
underscores the importance of a strong regulatory body to disincentivise moral hazard on the 
part of IPPs. Furthermore, when non-competitive bidding processes are used to procure IPPs, 
there is also a high risk of corruption in the award of IPP generation licenses Besant- Jones 
(2006) points out that in many countries, non transparent processes in concluding initial IPP 
contracts led to calls for their renegotiation, after allegations of corruption emerged. Despite 
these criticisms, IPPs remain the predominant viable alternative for African countries 
(Eberhard et al., 2016). This reality underscores the importance of this study, to identify what 
critical factors prevent or mitigate the challenges with IPPs that are identified in literature, in 
order to promote successful investment in IPPs in Zimbabwe.  
 
2.7! Theoretical Explanations of IPP Investment Outcomes 
 
In their study of the IPP experiences and outcomes in 13 developing countries, Victor et al. 
(2004) identified four key hypotheses or explanations as to what determines IPP outcomes. 
These are the obsolescing bargain, investment climate, electricity market structure and 
project management. Each of these explanations points to a cluster of key factors 
(independent variables) that explain IPP investment outcomes (dependent variable) observed 
in developing countries (Victor et al, 2004). An understanding of these hypotheses helps to 
orient and guide the exploration of the critical success factors for IPPs in Zimbabwe. 
 
The obsolescing bargain, pioneered by Vernon (1971) posits that there is an inevitable shift in 
bargaining power over the lifecycle of large private infrastructure investment deals, which 
makes the deals susceptible to revisions by the government. In the initial bargain, private 
investors have the upper hand as they possess the capital and the host government needs the 
infrastructure but lacks the capital to provide it on its own. But once the infrastructure is 
built, the initial bargain becomes obsolete as the government has secured what it needed, the 
infrastructure asset (Vernon 1977; Moran, 1998; Woodhouse, 2006). This underscores the 
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importance of the perception that a country upholds contracts and the availability of 
government guarantees in attracting investment for energy infrastructure. The investment 
climate can broadly be defined as “the set of location-specific factors shaping the 
opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create jobs, and expand.” (Smith 
& Hallward-Driemeier, 2005, p.40). This includes the macro environment, legal and 
regulatory context, public finances, the functioning of financial and product markets, 
institutions, management context and FDI experience (Smith & Hallward-Driemeier, 2005; 
Woodhouse, 2005; World Bank, 2005; World Bank 2007). The condition of the investment 
climate will determine whether investors have any incentives to undertake the project and 
also impacts financing by either discouraging or encouraging investment. 
 
 In relation to the electricity market structure, their study found that investment in IPPs 
occurred more in countries in which there was a higher the degree of electricity reform Other 
key elements of the electricity market structure that impact investment in IPPs highlighted by 
Victor et al. (2004) are electricity demand, the adequacy and condition of transmission 
infrastructure, the competency and independence of the regulator, and the existence of rapid 
payback mechanisms. With regard to project management, the authors highlight that the wide 
variation in investment outcomes across countries may not stem from investment 
environment characteristics, but rather on the ability of developers to negotiate financing and 
to carry out the necessary project development work to facilitate the actual investment Victor 
et al., 2004). For IPPs this implies investment outcomes are determined not only by the 
project environment or structural factors, but also how well project mangers manage planning 
and implementation. 
 
2.8! Critical Success Factors for Independent Power Projects  
!
The concept of critical success factors (CSFs) was first introduced by Rockart (1979) and 
elaborated on by Bullen and Rockart (1981) in their seminal contribution toward the design of 
management information systems. Bullen and Rockart (1981) define critical success factors as 
“the few key areas where 'things must go right' for the business to flourish and for the manager's 
goals to be attained” (p.3). This underscores the importance of an identification of CSFs in 
focusing the effort or actions of those responsible for a particular endeavour and in maximising 
the likelihood of the desired outcome being reached.  
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Although the potential benefits of IPP are widely understood, there has been a wide variation 
in the actual investment record and performance of IPPs within and across countries 
(Woodhouse, 2005; Eberhard et al., 2016).  Some notable successes include the IPP programs 
in Egypt, Mexico and Thailand (Woodhouse, 2005). These countries have attracted a 
substantive amount of private sector investment and have to a large extent been able to maintain 
stable working relationships between the government and investors (Woodhouse, 2005).  More 
recently, the Renewable Energy Independent Power Procurement Program (REIPPP) in South 
Africa is another noteworthy success. Since its inception in 2011, the program has in a 
relatively short period of time “delivered remarkable investment and price outcomes” 
(Eberhard et al., 2014, p.4). To date, a total of 92 projects have been awarded, of which 42 are 
operational. The combined generation capacity of all the projects is 6327 MW of renewable 
power and and the total private sector investment amounts a $20,5 billion. (Eberhard et al., 
2016).  
In sharp contrast to these positive experiences, IPPs in many other countries have not been as 
successful in attracting investment and have faced significant challenges in project 
implementation (Woodhouse, 2005). Notable examples include allegations of corruption in the 
award of IPP contracts in Indonesia, stranded cost problems for IPPs in Poland due to ongoing 
electricity market reform and severe pricing pressures facing thermal IPPs in Brazil and the 
very visible failure of the Enron Dabhol project in Maharashtra, India (Woodhouse, 2005). 
This wide variation in outcomes across countries, coupled with the need for massive investment 
in power generation in developing countries, has led researchers to investigate why some 
countries have had more success in attracting private investment and implementing IPP 
programs than others.  
2.8.1! Previous Studies on CSFs for IPPs in Developing Countries 
A key element required for the success of IPPs and infrastructure projects highlighted in 
literature is the creation of an enabling or attractive environment for investment (Victor et al., 
2004; Eberhard et al., 2016). This refers to the interrelated characteristics of a business 
environment or country, that impact the ability of project stakeholders to engage in project 
development effectively, such as the macro environment, legal and regulatory context, public 
finances, the functioning of financial and product markets, institutions, management context 
and FDI experience (Smith & Hallward-Driemeier, 2005; Woodhouse, 2005; WB, 2005; WB, 
2007). In terms of investment, literature has shown that there is a positive link between 
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investment in developing countries and a good investment climate (Bleaney, 1996; Bhaduri, 
2005; WB, 2005; WB, 2007; Beck, Fuchs, & Uy, 2009). In relation to IPPs, the investment 
climate will determine whether sponsors have any incentives to undertake the project and 
also impacts financing by either discouraging or encouraging investment. This suggests that 
the quality of the investment climate is a key determinant of investment in IPPs.  
Some studies have focused on the CSFs for a specific element or component of the overall 
enabling environment for IPPs. For example, Chowdury and Charoenngam (2008) examined 
IPPs in Asia to determine the success factors for developing an appropriate legal framework 
for IPP project financing. They found that a competitive bidding framework is necessary to 
give credibility to IPPs and that government should provide payment guarantees to stand 
behind the state utilities’ obligations (Chowdury & Charoenngam, 2008). With regards to risk, 
they found that government should initiate engagements with export credit agencies (ECAs) 
and Multilateral Banks to provide political and commercial risk coverage for IPPs (Chowdury 
& Charoenngam, 2008). 
Other studies have used a case study approach to investigate the critical success factors for 
specific types of IPP projects. Zhao et al. (2010) employed the CSF methodology to investigate 
the critical success factors for BOT power projects in China. Their study was a comparative 
analysis between the success factors for thermal power projects versus wind power projects. 
This comparison is particularly useful given the growing concern globally of the sustainability 
and environmental effects of the use of fossil fuels in generation. A total of 64 factors were 
identified from literature to be tested using the CSF methodology. They found that for thermal 
projects, the level of economic development, degree of public recognition and environmental 
protection requirements are far more significant factors of success than in wind projects (Zhao 
et al., 2010). In another case based study, Ali, Sopian, Yen, Mat, and Zaharim (2008) 
investigated the key success factors for implementing a renewable energy program in Malaysia. 
The authors identified four key factors, namely: the establishment of programs to provide 
information services, raise awareness and build capacity in renewable technology; the use of 
demonstration projects to increase the acceptance and understanding of renewable technology; 
strengthening renewable energy policies and government led financial mechanisms to 
encourage investment in renewable energy; and enhancing the industry’s R&D efforts (Ali et 
al., 2008). 
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Studies like Zhao, Zuo and Zillante (2013) and Gupta et al. (2013) have investigated the general 
key success factors that promote and facilitate greenfield investment in power generation. Zhao 
et al. (2013) identified 14 factors at both a macro and micro level that impact project success. 
At the macro level, they found that the level of local economic development, public acceptance, 
environmental regulations, political stability, legal landscape, economic policy and credit 
regulations are factors influencing the rate of investment in projects. At the micro level, they 
found that the capacity of key project stakeholders, namely the project developer, contractor 
and suppliers, had a significant impact on investment. A key insight from their findings is that 
successful investment in projects requires the combined efforts of all project stakeholders and 
not just policy makers (Zhao et al., 2013). Gupta et al. (2013) investigated the critical success 
factors for BOT power projects in India. Their methodology entailed an extensive literature 
review and focus group discussions to identify success factors and a questionnaire administered 
to sector experts to determine rankings for the factors (Gupta et al., 2013). They found that the 
top 5 critical success factors for investment were a concession agreement, a short-construction 
period, the concessionaire award procedure, adequate long-term demand and adequate net cash 
flows (Gupta et al., 2013). 
Yusof & Salami (2013) explored the success factors for BOT power plant projects in Iran. They 
identified 33 factors through an extensive review of relevant literature and used a questionnaire 
survey to ascertain the relative significance of the factors. They further investigated whether 
there was agreement on the ratings of factors by the three groups of project stakeholders 
surveyed for the study, namely government officials, concessionaires and consultants. The 
results revealed differing perspectives amongst the three stakeholders. Government officials 
considered an ‘attractive financial package’ as the most critical factor, while concessionaires 
and consultants rated ‘the capability to lead the project by government’ and ‘appropriate project 
identification’ as the most important factors, respectively (Yusof & Salami, 2013). This seems 
to suggest that the successful investment in IPPs requires a full appreciation and understanding 
of the various needs and objectives of all the project stakeholders and the creation of an 
environment that adequately addresses them. 
A commonality across most the studies surveyed for this study is the research methodology 
used to identify CSFs. Success factors were identified by conducting a comprehensive 
literature review and verified through semi structured interviews with practitioner experts or 
project stakeholders to generate a final list of critical success factors. A survey questionnaire 
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was then administered to key stakeholders to evaluate the criticality of the list of factors (Yusof 
& Salami, 2013). A similar methodology is employed for this study. 
2.9! A framework for exploring CSFs for IPPs 
!
Researchers with the Management Programme in Infrastructure Reform & Regulation have for 
over a decade analysed the outcomes of approximately 20 IPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa. An 
important outcome of their seminal research is that they have identified and compiled a list of 
12 factors that contribute to the creation of an enabling environment for sustainable IPP 
investment (Eberhard et al., 2016). This list of factors provides a first sketch for best practices 
in IPP development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Eberhard and Gratwick 2011) and provides a 
framework through which the CSFs for IPPs in other Sub-Saharan African countries can be 
explored. This framework makes a distinction between country level and project level factors 
(Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008).  
 
2.9.1! Country Level Factors 
!
At the country level, they identify a favourable investment climate, clear policy and legal 
frameworks, coherent power sector planning, independent regulation and competitive 
procurement process as critical success factors (Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008). Noteworthy 
about these factors is that they are predominantly in the purview of government or policy 
makers (Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008). This suggests that the success of IPPs, in terms of 
investment and implementation requires adequate and intentional support from the 
government. 
  
2.9.2! Project Level Factors 
!
Project level factors are the factors over which the project sponsors and investors have some 
measure of control and if carefully structured and managed, these factors contribute towards 
the successful implementation of IPPs and enable them to better weather any external shocks 
and stresses. These factors are favorable debt and equity arrangements, a creditworthy offtaker, 
adequate revenue security arrangements, credit enhancements, sound risk management and 
mitigation practices, strong technical performance and strategic relationship building and 
management by sponsors are the elements necessary to underpin sustainable investment in IPPs 
(Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008).  The table below presents a summary of the country level and 
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project level factors identified by Gratwick & Eberhard (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Factors Contributing to Successful Independent Power Project Investments in Sub 
Saharan Africa 
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Source: Reprinted from Independent Power Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lessons from Five Key Countries by A. Eberhard, K. Gratwick, E. Morella and P. Antmann, p. 42. 
Copyright 2016 by World Bank. 
  
 
2.9.3! MIR Research on IPPs in Africa - Lessons from the South Africa’s Renewable 
Energy Program 
The spectacular success of the South African REIPPP has attracted much attention, both in the 
region and the rest of the continent (Brodsky & Matarirano, 2015). Using a case study 
approach, Eberhard et al. (2014) explored the South African experience in order to identify the 
key factors behind the program’s success. They identified 19 success factors, such as a high 
level of political support for the program, the expertise of the REIPPP management team, the 
ad hoc institutional separation of the IPP Unit from the rest of the Department of Energy, 
multiple bidding rounds and donor and multilateral support for the program. Another important 
aspect of their research is that they outline some valuable lessons that other countries 
contemplating the procurement renewable energy infrastructure investments can glean from 
the South African experience. These include the need for credible and effective project 
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champions to interface with all project stakeholders, the potential for renewable energy 
programs to foster local social and economic development and that a well designed, transparent 
procurement process is key to unlocking private investment in energy infrastructure, both from 
sponsors and financiers (Eberhard et al., 2014). A unique insight of their research relates to the 
ongoing debate of which type of tender, competitive versus feed-in tariffs (FITs), yields better 
tariff investment outcomes. They found that competitive procurement provides better tariff 
outcomes, but regardless of the type of tender chosen, a clear procurement framework is what 
is necessary to unlock investment from private sector developers (Eberhard et al., 2014). 
2.10! Research Context: IPPs and the Energy Sector in Zimbabwe 
 
2.10.1! Institutional Setting  
 
The institutional setting and governance structure of the energy sector in Zimbabwe is shown 
in the diagram below: 
 
Figure 2:Institutional Setting of the Zimbabwe Energy Sector 
 
 
                                  Source: Author’s compilation from National Energy Policy, 2012 
 
 
The Ministry of Energy and Power Development is the government department with the 
overall responsibility for the energy sector in Zimbabwe. Its mandate includes formulation of 
policy, performance monitoring and regulation, promotion of renewable energy sources, 
energy conservation and research. It also supervises and oversees the performance of the 
energy utility, its subsidiaries and other specialized agencies in the energy sector (National 
Energy Policy, 2012). ZERA is a statutory body whose primary function is to regulate the 
energy sector and create an environment that promotes competition and efficiency in the 
sector. ZERA is responsible for licensing all players involved in electricity generation, 
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transmission, distribution, supply and regulating and approving the associated tariffs (ZERA, 
2016b). 
2.10.2! Policy Framework 
 
There are three key pieces of legislation that govern the energy sector in Zimbabwe. These 
are the Electricity Act of 2002, the Energy Regulatory Authority Act of 2011 and the 
National Energy Policy of 2012. An overview of the main aspects of each can be found in 
Appendix A. With regards to private participation in the energy sector, the National Energy 
Policy states that government’s intent is for the private sector to become, “the engine for 
provision of energy services” (National Energy Policy, 2012, p. ix). It also states that 
government is committed to encouraging the participation of IPPs in the energy sector in 
order to improve the efficiency of the sector, diversify energy supplies and reduce the 
country’s reliance on energy imports. Notably, the policy states that the key to achieving the 
strategic goal of private sector led energy provision was to improve the governance and 
institutional framework of the power sector (National Energy Policy, 2012). Government is 
also currently formulating two key new policies, namely the Renewable Energy Policy 
(REP), to address gaps in the current energy policy, promote investment in renewable energy 
and increase the supply of environmentally friendly renewable energy sources; and a 
National Integrated Energy Resource Plan (NEIRP), to provide a long term resource plan for 
meeting the country’s energy demand. 
 
2.10.3!  The Electricity Market  
 
The electricity market in Zimbabwe is a single buyer market, with competition in generation. 
The diagram below illustrates the electricity market structure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Zimbabwe Electricity Market Structure 
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The electricity market is dominated by the state owned utility Zesa Holdings and its 
subsidiaries the ZPC and Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission and Distribution Company 
(ZETDC) (Climatescope, 2016). ZPC carries out power generation and operates five power 
stations. ZETDC is responsible for the transmission and distribution of electric power and for 
its sale, including meter reading, billing, cash collection, and credit control of the retail 
business. It buys generation from its sister company ZPC and independent power producers. 
ZETDC is also the system operator and trades power with other countries in the region 
through the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP).  
!
2.10.4!  Power Generation Situation 
!
The country is heavily reliant on thermal and hydropower for electricity generation. The 
country’s total installed capacity is 2.02 GW. Power generation is dominated by ZPC, which 
currently produces over 95% of the power used in the country. The bulk of that supply comes 
from two of its power stations, the 750MW hydroelectric Kariba South Power Station and 
920MW Hwange Thermal Power Station (ZPC, 2016). Approximately 120MW of installed 
capacity comes from IPPs, namely small hydropower plants and biomass plants 
(Climatescope, 2016).  
 
Zimbabwe has seen a very large reduction in power supply over the last decade. At present, 
only an estimated 45% is available for power generation. With peak demand at 2,2GW, this 
has created a national energy deficit of approximately 1GW (Ministry of Energy and Power 
Development [MOEPD], 2016). This is primarily because the country’s fleet of thermal 
power stations experiences frequent technical faults as the equipment is aged and past its 
useful life. Furthermore, perennial droughts have resulted in declining water levels at Kariba 
Dam, restricting the hydropower station’s generation capacity. To augment supply, the 
country has relied on demand side management initiatives and the imports of power from its 
neighbours to meet demand (MOEPD, 2016), but these are only stopgap measures. A long-
term solution requires the procurement of new generation capacity. The Government aims to 
achieve this by undertaking several expansion projects, which are in the early stages of 
development, and procuring independent power producers. 
 
 
 36 
 
2.10.5! IPPs in Zimbabwe 
!
2.10.5.1! Procurement  
 
The procurement of IPPs in Zimbabwe is done through ZERA, using an unsolicited bids 
framework. A generation license gives the holder the right to own, construct and operate a 
generation plant for a period of 25 years. This period is deemed sufficiently long to enable 
investors to recoup their investment and earn a sufficient return that is commensurate with 
the risk taken in investing in generation infrastructure in Zimbabwe. The license is 
conditional upon the achievement of certain conditions, mainly key project agreements, 
permits and timelines that are set at the time of licensing.  
 
2.10.5.2! Requirements to reach financial closure 
!
In order to reach financial closure and begin construction, IPPs need to acquire various 
statutory permits and consents, such as the environmental impact assessment certificate 
(EIA), fuel supply agreements in the case of thermal and hydro, and land leases with 
government where the developer does not own the land. A list of the typical fees for the main 
permits required for IPPs can be found in Appendix A. The central agreement IPPs also need 
to negotiate and acquire is the PPA with ZETDC for the sale of power. The generation tariff 
however, is not negotiated directly with the offtaker. Once the main PPA document has been 
agreed with the offtaker, IPPs make an application for a generation tariff directly to the 
regulator. It is the regulator’s responsibility to adjudicate tariff applications from IPPs and 
approve or disprove the tariff. The current methodology used to determine the tariff is a cost-
plus methodology. In addition to the requirements stated above, potential financiers often 
require IPPs to procure certain guarantees from government, namely policy and sovereign 
guarantees, before making the investment. 
 
2.10.5.3! Licensed IPPs 
 
To date, ZERA has licensed a total of 29 IPPs for various technologies. Details of the 
licensees can be found in Appendix A. The split by energy mix is ten solar, 11 mini hydros, 
one biomass, three coal fired, one gas fired and three cogeneration plants (ZERA, 2016a). Of 
the 29 licensed IPPs only 11 have reached financial closure, of which nine are operational 
and two in construction. Table 3 below gives details about the size and investment costs of 
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the IPPs that have reached financial closure. 
   
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Mtunzi, Mampwheli, Meyer, & Mungwena, 2012; ZERA,2016; 
PGBI Group, 2016 and MOEPD, 2016. 
Note:   * official estimates 
          ** researcher’s estimates using figures from Mtunzi et al. (2012) where total investment    cost 
for 20MW steam turbines is 11.58 million US dollars 
 
 
Of the operational IPPs, one produces for own consumption, two produce for own 
consumption and offload their excess to the grid, while the rest supply the grid. This 
translates to 37,9% successful investment rate, which is very low given the size of the 
capacity shortfall. Understanding why this rate is so low and what needs to be done to 
improve the rate of investment in IPPs is the main objective of this research. 
Table 3: IPPs in operation or construction in Zimbabwe 
 38 
 
2.11! Summary 
!
Researchers have investigated the CSFs for various types of IPPs in developing countries in 
order to increase the incidence of successful projects in light of the urgent need for energy 
security and stability to promote economic growth in those countries. Country level and 
project level factors or attributes have been identified that promote investment in IPPs and 
the successful execution of projects. Gratwick & Eberhard (2008) have created a framework 
of exploring CSFs for IPPs in Sub Saharan Africa. The authors highlight that although their 
list of factors provides a first sketch of best practice in IPPs for the region, it is by no means 
exhaustive (Eberhard et al., 2016). Each country has its own unique set of circumstances that 
results in a new set of success factors necessary to navigate that specific environment and to 
ensure project success. This underscores the need for individual country analysis of the CSFs 
for IPPs in that country environment. This study seeks to do just that; to investigate the CSFs 
for IPPs in Zimbabwe using the framework developed by Gratwick & Eberhard (2008) to 
guide the investigation. 
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3! RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter presents the research methodology and design that is used to explore the 
specific research questions of this study. This study is exploratory in nature as it seeks to 
provide a preliminary understanding of the IPP sector in Zimbabwe, which is still in its 
infancy and has not been previously researched. It also seeks to explore from the vantage 
point of key stakeholders, what the CSFs for IPP investment are, and to identify specific 
strategies to improve current outcomes. 
 
3.1! Research Approach  
 
There are three possible research approaches that can be employed in any study, namely 
quantitative (close-ended), qualitative (open-ended) and mixed methods, which is the 
combination or integration of qualitative and quantitative techniques (Creswell, 2003). For 
this study, a mixed methods research approach was adopted to explore the research problem.  
 
3.1.1! Mixed Methods Research 
 
The mixed methods approach developed out of the realisation by several scholars that the 
need and complexity of the phenomenon being investigated is such that a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative techniques address the research questions better than either 
techniques could independently (Newman, Ridenour, Newman, & DeMarco, 2003; Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). Johnson et al. (2007) therefore define mixed methods as “the 
type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative 
viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth 
and depth of understanding and corroboration” (Johnson et al., 2007, p. 123). 
  
There are two major reasons why the mixed methods approach was selected for this study: to 
handle threats to validity inherent in the use of one method by applying the alternative 
method as a way to enhance the validity of the research methods and study findings and to 
gain a multi-faceted view and deeper understanding of the phenomenon under investigation 
from the complementary findings generated from the use of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods (Johnson et al., 2007; Creswell, 2014).Victor et al. (2004) point out that existing 
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literature on IPP experiences and outcomes suffers from the classic trade-off in empirical 
research between overly broad conclusions of quantitative survey techniques and the overly 
specific and non-generalizable conclusions of qualitative techniques (Victor et al., 2004). The 
adoption of a mixed methods approach for this study aims to strike a better balance in the 
nature, quality and generalisability of the research findings from the investigation of the IPP 
industry in Zimbabwe.  
 
3.2! Research Design  
 
There are three primary research designs for conducting mixed methods research; convergent 
parallel, explanatory sequential and exploratory sequential (Creswell, 2003). A convergent 
parallel design involves the simultaneous collection of both qualitative and quantitative data 
and integrating the data to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem 
(Creswell, 2003). The explanatory sequential and exploratory sequential designs involve the 
sequential collection of data, where the findings of one method are explained, built upon or 
elaborated using another method. For this study, an exploratory sequential design was 
chosen. 
 
3.2.1! An Exploratory Sequential Design 
 
The choice of design for this study was informed by the nature of the research questions as 
well as the overall objectives of the study. According to Hanson, Creswell, Plano Clark, 
Petska and Creswell (2005) the primary purpose of the exploratory sequential design is to 
explore relationships where little or no research or theory exists. Similarly, there has been 
little research on the IPP sector in Zimbabwe. The first two objectives of this study, which 
are to identify the CSFs and their relative rankings, cannot be answered very effectively using 
purely qualitative or quantitative methods. Grunert and Ellegaard (1992) in a seminal paper 
on the theory and method of CSFs, establish that an empirical analysis of CSFs requires a 
combination of both methods; qualitative to generate hypotheses about actual success factors 
and quantitative to test the hypotheses and establish the CSFs (Grunert & Ellegaard, 1992). 
Furthermore, previous studies exploring the CSFs for power projects such as Yusof & Salami 
(2013) and Gupta et al. (2013) have also adopted an exploratory sequential research design.  
The sequencing of research methods employed in this study is illustrated in the diagram 
below: 
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The first qualitative phase was used to gain an in-depth understanding of the IPP outcomes in 
Zimbabwe and to identify the success factors for financing from the perspective of key 
stakeholders. The success factors identified in the qualitative first phase were then used to 
create a survey instrument for the second quantitative phase to determine which factors were 
perceived as most critical, their rankings and whether the ranks assigned differed by 
stakeholder grouping. The main advantages of using the exploratory sequential design is that 
it helps generate more holistic overall study findings because the first qualitative phase yields 
a rich, contextual understanding of IPP investment in Zimbabwe, while the second 
quantitative phase gives more representative and generalizable findings (Green & Caracelli, 
2003). Two major challenges in implementing an exploratory sequential design that relate 
directly to my study are to the composition of the samples in each of the phases and 
appropriately focusing qualitative findings to generate the instrument for the second 
quantitative phase.  
 
3.3! Qualitative Sampling, Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The next section explains the sampling, data collection and data analysis techniques used for 
the qualitative first phase of the study. 
 
3.3.1! Sampling  
 
The target population was all expert stakeholders involved in the development and 
implementation of IPPs in Zimbabwe, where expert is defined as individuals with known and 
demonstrable experience and expertise in IPP and energy infrastructure development. This 
Figure 3: Exploratory sequential design for the research study 
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includes the project sponsors or developers, advisors (financial, legal and technical), 
financiers or investors such as banks and pension funds, officials at the regulator, ZERA, 
senior management of the national utility, ZETDC and officials in the two key line ministries, 
the MOEPD and Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoF). The sampling 
method used was non-probability sampling, namely criterion-based purposive sampling. 
Purposive sampling involves the selection of participants based on a study’s specific 
objectives and research questions, rather than at random (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003; 
Teddlie & Yu, 2007; Palys, 2008). The criterion strategy is used to select participants based 
on a characteristic or trait that varies within the population (Teddlie & Yu, 2007; Palys, 
2008). Moustakas (1994) emphasises that the selected participants should demonstrate the 
requisite knowledge and experience for the study and be able to adequately reflect upon the 
subject of investigation. In order to achieve this, interviews were conducted with the most 
senior representatives of each stakeholder grouping in terms of role in the organisation and 
years of experience in the industry.  
 
A small sample was chosen for the interviews, partly due to constraints on time on the part of 
both the practitioners and the researcher. A total number of fifteen interviews were 
conducted. This was in line with the number of interviews conducted in other qualitative 
studies. Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006) suggest that the number of interviews can range 
between 6 to 12 participants for a qualitative study while Baker and Edwards (2012) deem 15 
participants to be sufficient to reach data saturation when participants are highly 
knowledgeable about the topic of inquiry. Interviewees were selected from each stakeholder 
grouping in order for the sample to be adequately representative of the population at interest, 
allowing the findings to be generalizable or applicable to the wider population (Krefting, 
1991). All the interviewees had extensive experience in the energy sector and IPP related 
experience. The breakdown of interviewees by stakeholder groupings is shown in the 
diagram below.  
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Figure 4: Interviewee Breakdown by Stakeholder Grouping 
 
 
 
3.3.2! Data Collection 
 
Semi structured interviews were the data collection method used to identify success factors 
for IPP investment in Zimbabwe and recommendations from stakeholders as to how 
implementation might be improved in order to increase the number of IPPs reaching financial 
closure. There are two other forms of interviews that could have been used, namely 
structured and open-ended interviews. In structured interviews all questions are prepared 
beforehand, standardised and all respondents are asked exactly the same series of questions. 
Unstructured interviews entail no specific format or questions (Bryman & Bell, 2007). Semi-
structured interviews were preferred for this study because they are less time consuming than 
unstructured interviews, offer more flexibility than structured interviews and allow responses 
across interviewees to be compared. A major criticism of interviews is that results are 
difficult to generalise as they are obtained from a limited number of people. In this study, the 
second quantitative phase of investigation mitigated by use of a larger sample and providing 
further validation of the interview findings.  
 
Although the interviews were conducted as open discussions, an interview framework, 
comprising a series of questions derived from literature on the success factors for IPPs in Sub 
Saharan Africa by Gratwick and Eberhard (2008) was used to guide the discussions with 
stakeholders. The interview framework used in this study is presented in Appendix B.  Two 
test interviews with work colleagues of the researcher in energy infrastructure development 
advisory were conducted prior to the actual interviews to refine questions and procedures to 
IPP#Developers
34%
Advisors#
13%Financial# Investors
20%
Regulatory#Authority#
Officials
7%
Government#
Department# Officials
13%
Utility# Personnel
13%
INTERVIEWEE#BREAKDOWN#BY#STAKEHOLDER#
GROUPING
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ensure effective use of time.  All interviews were conducted in Harare as face-to-face 
interviews. One interview was held at a coffee shop and for all the rest, the researcher 
travelled to the respondents’ respective places of work. All but three interviews, with the 
prior consent of the respondents, were captured through audio recording and all fifteen 
interviews were transcribed on the day of the interview to mitigate recall bias. All interview 
data and related documentation has been stored electronically on a password protected hard 
drive to be kept for a period of five years. 
 
Permission to conduct the study involving human participants was obtained from the 
University of Cape Town’s Ethics Committee, prior to commencing the study, in order to 
ensure the ethical treatment and protection of the participants. Prior to the interviews, all 
prospective participants were sent a formal invitation to participate in the study and an 
informed consent form (see Appendix B) via email, that also explained the purpose of the 
study and how the findings would be and used. The form also highlighted that the 
participants were free to withdraw form the study at any time. This form was signed by each 
respondent before the start of the interview. Each respondent was assigned a pseudonym, 
specifically a number, in order to conceal their identity. Any direct quotes from participants 
will be identified only by those numbers for example: Respondent 2. 
 
3.3.3! Data Analysis 
 
Qualitative data analysis entails “bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of 
collected data” (Marshall & Rossman,1990, p. 111). The interview transcripts and audio 
recordings were analysed using thematic content analysis, using the five step method 
developed by Mc Cracken (1988), with the aid of NVivo7, a software package that provides 
an avenue for flexible and rigorous analysis of qualitative data. The five steps involved were: 
1.! Reading and reviewing the interview transcripts with the primary goal of sifting out the 
important or pertinent material in the transcripts and making notes on their observations.  
2.! Creation of preliminary categories or themes, descriptive and interpretive in the software 
program, based on the interview transcripts and literature review used to guide the 
research.  
3.! Identification of patterns or connections within the preliminary categories or themes 
using the software program.  
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4.! Determining the key basic themes that are common across all or most of the interview 
responses by examining the pertinent material in the transcripts and researcher’s notes 
that were inputted into the software program in Step One.  
5.! Examination of themes from all interviews across groupings, to delineate predominant 
themes contained in the data. These predominant themes then formed the basis for 
writing up the data (Mc Cracken,1988; Piercy, 2004). 
 
3.4! Quantitative Sampling, Data Collection and Analysis  
 
The next section explains the sampling, data collection and data analysis techniques used for 
the quantitative second phase of the study.  
 
3.4.1! Sampling  
 
The target population for the second phase was all the expert stakeholders involved in the 
development and implementation of IPPs in Zimbabwe. However, for sampling, the 
stakeholders that participated in the first phase of the study were excluded in order to avoid 
internal invalidity. Creswell (2014) points out that a good procedure for exploratory 
sequential designs is to draw the samples for both phases of the research from the same 
population, but to ensure the individuals are not the same for each sample. Surveying the 
interview respondents, who helped develop the survey instrument in the first place, “would 
introduce confounding factors into the study” (Creswell, 2014, p. 246). The target population 
and samples for both phases of this study are illustrated in the diagram below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase&2&
Sample
Phase&1&
Sample
Population
Figure 5: Population and sample for Phase 2 
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The sampling method used to select the survey candidates was purposive sampling, in order 
to obtain a sample that was as large and as representative as possible. Teddlie and Yu (2007) 
highlight that purposive sampling is advantageous where the goals of sampling are to achieve 
a sample that is as representative as possible of the population and to achieve comparability 
across a dimension of interest (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). In relation to the size of the sample, 
Kent (1993) points out that the sample size depends on the purposes of the research and the 
characteristics of the population. Being a nascent industry, the population of stakeholders 
with the requisite experience and expertise in the development of IPPs in Zimbabwe is small, 
therefore a target sample size of n equals 40 was chosen for this study. An equal 
representation of each stakeholder grouping was aimed at for representativeness and 
comparability. The breakdown of the actual number of respondents that participated in the 
study is shown in the table below: 
 
Table 4: Breakdown of respondents by stakeholder grouping 
 
 
 
3.4.2! Data Collection 
 
A self-administered semi structured survey questionnaire was the research instrument used to 
collect data. Survey questionnaires are frequently used as data collection instruments in 
exploratory research (Clarke & Dawson, 1999) and have been used in the majority of studies 
that explore critical success factors in projects (Tiong, Khim-Teck, & McCarthy, 1992; 
Akintoye, Li, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005; Zhang, 2005; Qiao et al., 2001; Zhao et al., 
2010; Gupta et al., 2013). Survey questionnaires provide several advantages for the 
researcher, including being a cost effective way to collect standardised information from a 
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large number of people in as short period of time (Ackroyd & Hughes, 1981; McClelland, 
1994; Clarke & Dawson, 1999), reduced researcher bias when compared to interviews 
(McClelland, 1994; Clarke & Dawson, 1999), anonymity and privacy for participants (Bird, 
2009) and results that are easily quantified (Popper, 2004). A survey questionnaire was 
suitable in the context of the sequential exploratory research design of this study, to build 
upon the findings of the qualitative first phase (Creswell, 2003).  
 
The findings from the qualitative phase of the research were used to develop the wording and 
categorisation of the survey questionnaire. The format of the questionnaire is found in 
Appendix C. In addition to asking general information about respondents’ backgrounds, the 
questionnaire used a 5- point Likert scale to capture respondents’ perceptions regarding the 
energy sector in general and the importance and ranking of the success and risk factors 
identified in phase one. The choice of using the 5-point scale over other scales with less or 
more items is because the 5-point scale is the most widely used form of Likert scales in 
applied social science research (van der Ejik & Rose, 2015). In relation to the investigation of 
CSFs for infrastructure projects, several studies have also employed the 5-point scale 
(Akintoye et al., 2005; Zhang, 2005; Gupta et al., 2013; Wai, Yusof, Ismail, & Ng, 2012).  
 
Although questionnaires reduce the degree of researcher bias, weaknesses in questionnaire 
design and wording can introduce bias in the results and the possibility of misinterpretation 
of questions by participants (Meadows, 2003). The researcher mitigated this by testing the 
questionnaire with colleagues prior to administering it to respondents, to ensure clarity of 
meaning in the questions, non-ambiguity in wording and to assess the overall appearance of 
the questionnaire.  
 
Due to budget and time constraints, the questionnaires were administered online as a web 
survey using Survey Monkey. Potential participants were invited to participate in the survey 
via an email containing a link to the survey. Some participants preferred to complete the 
survey offline so the researcher printed copies of the survey, delivered them to the 
participants, who then returned them to the researcher after a week. A covering letter, that 
provides an explanation of the purpose of the study and an invitation to volunteer to complete 
the questionnaire, was attached to the survey questionnaire. Completion of the questionnaire 
and submission of it to the researcher was considered informed consent by the participants 
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3.4.3! Data Analysis Methods 
 
The data analysis methods applied in this study are guided by the methods employed by 
Zhang (2005) and were chosen based on which methods most appropriately fit this study, 
firstly to answer the research questions, and secondly to ensure the validity and reliability of 
the results. The statistical software package SPSS was used to aid the analysis. 
 
3.4.3.1! Questionnaire Reliability Test - Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient 
 
Prior to conducting the data analysis, the reliability of the questionnaire was determined by 
computing Cronbach’s Alpha for the collected survey data in SPSS. The results of this test 
are presented in Chapter 5. Cronbach's alpha is a coefficient that measures the internal 
consistency of a questionnaire (Burns, 2000). It measures how reliably the set of variables 
used in the analysis measure a single construct (Cronbach, 1951). There is no consensus 
among statisticians on what constitutes an acceptable value of alpha (Boyle, 1991; Nunnally 
& Bernstein, 1994; DeVellis, 2003), but by convention, an alpha value in the range of 0.65 
and 0.80 is often considered an acceptable level of reliability (Nunally, 1978; Pallant 2001; 
Vaske, 2008).  
 
3.4.3.2! Descriptive Statistics 
 
The mean score, standard deviation, variance and coefficient of variation for the data were 
calculated in order to give a basic description of the survey data (Larson, 2006). The 
distribution of the data is of particular importance because it will determine what type of 
statistical analysis can be performed. Parametric analysis is used when the data is normally 
distributed. If the data is not normally distributed non-parametric analysis is appropriate. For 
this study, the Shapiro-Wilk test was used to test the normality of the data. It tests the null 
hypothesis that the data is normally distributed.  
 
3.4.3.3!Criticality Index  
 
Mean ranking and the relative importance index are the two primary methods used in 
previous studies on CSFs to determine the criticality and ranking of factors (Zhang, 2005; 
Shehu & Akintoye, 2009; Gupta et al., 2013; Muhwezi, Acai, & Otim, 2014). In this study, 
we use both the mean score and the relative importance index method to evaluate the 
 49 
 
criticality of the success factors. The relative importance index (RII) is defined as the 
proportion of variation in the criterion variable that each predictor variable explains, taking 
into account both on its own direct effect and its effect in combination with other predictor 
variables (Johnson & LeBreton, 2004). For this study, the RII of each factor can be 
interpreted as the contribution of each of the factors to the successful financing of IPPs in 
Zimbabwe. The RII for each factor was computed based on equation (1) below that has been 
used in other CSF studies (Gupta et al., 2013; Muhwezi et al., 2014): 
 !"" = $%∗' 0 ≤ !"" ≤ 1         (1) 
       
       
Where, W is the weighting given to each factor by the respondents based on the Likert scale 
and ranges from 1 to 5. 
A is the highest weight, which is 5 for this study. 
N is the total number of respondents.  
The closer the RII is to one, the more critical the factor. The RIIs for the success factors were 
calculated for the overall or combined responses, the private sector responses and the public 
sector responses. 
 
3.4.3.4! Rank Analysis 
 
The ranking of the success factors was determined by comparing the factors’ respective RIIs. 
The factor with the highest RII ranked highest, and the factor with the lowest RII ranked 
lowest. The rankings were computed based on the overall responses, the private sector 
responses and the public sector responses. 
 
3.4.3.5!Agreement Analysis 
 
In this study, the level of agreement in the ranking of the CSFs between private and public 
sectors was measured in order to investigate whether significant differences exist between the 
perceptions of the public and private sectors on the critical success factors for IPPs in 
Zimbabwe. The Kendall (1955) coefficient of concordance, also known as Kendall’s tau, 
evaluates the degree of concordance between two sets of ranked data. An alternative similar 
to Kendall’s tau that could also be used is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. 
However, Kendall’s tau has certain advantages over Spearman’s rho, namely that the former 
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is more easily interpreted and has a distribution with better statistical properties than the latter 
(Conover, 1980). Furthermore, should tied ranks be present in the data, a variation of 
Kendall’s tau known as Kendall’s tau b exists that can handle tied ranks in the data (Kendall, 
1970). For this study we will use Kendall’s tau b to study the degree of agreement between 
the private and public sector rankings of the CSFs. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
agreement in the rankings of CSFs by the private sector and public sector. The value of 
Kendall's tau has a range between -1 and 1, with 1 indicating very strong agreement between 
two sets of rankings and -1 indicating very strong disagreement. 
 
Okpala & Aniekwu (1988) developed a method to measure the level of agreement in the 
ranking of factors between two groups known as the rank agreement factor (RAF). The RAF 
gives the average absolute difference in the ranking of factors between two groups.  
The RAF is defined according to the following equation 
RAF = ./012/034051 '         (2) 
where the ith item in group 1 is Ri1, the ith item in group 2 is Ri2 and N is the number of 
items.  
The maximum RAF for any two groups is  
RAF678 = ./012/934051 '          (3) 
where j = N – i + 1. 
From the RAF and maximum RAF, the percentage disagreement (PD) can be calculated 
according to the following equation  
PD. = ./012/034051 ./012/934051 ∗ 100         (4) 
The percentage agreement (PA) is simply defined as PA = 100 − PD          (5) 
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A RAF of zero corresponds to perfect agreement in the ranking between the two groups and 
the higher the value of RAF is, the lower the agreement between the two groups. Several 
other studies on CSFs (Zhang, 2005) have used this method to evaluate the level of 
agreement in the ranking of factors between distinct groups of respondents. For this study we 
use Kendall’s tau to assess the overall level of concordance in the ranking of the factors 
between the private and public sector respondents and the RAF method to measure the actual 
level of agreement or disagreement between the two groups. 
3.5! Reliability and Validity 
 
Due to the vital nature of this area of study to the economic development of Zimbabwe, the 
researcher was mindful to maintain the reliability and validity in the selection and use of the 
methods employed in each phase of the study. Reliability in qualitative research refers to the 
consistency of approach employed by a researcher (Gibbs, 2007). The use of the interview 
protocol helped to establish consistency across all the interviews. Secondly, the researcher 
documented the procedures used to carry out the research and report findings, which enables 
the research procedures to be duplicated or followed by another researcher (Moustakas, 1994; 
Gibbs, 2007; Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013). Validity in qualitative research refers to the 
accuracy of the research findings (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Gibbs, 2007). To ensure 
accuracy of the research findings, in addition to written notes, the interviews were recorded 
to enable content checking by the researcher after the interviews and transcribing was 
conducted within two days of the interview to reduce reporting error. Peer debriefing, in the 
form of the guidance provided by the researcher’s academic supervisors, was also used to 
“enhance the accuracy of the account” (Creswell, 2014, p. 252). Researcher bias was 
mitigated by use of an interview framework that provided theory-guided structure to the 
interview process as opposed to the researcher’s own ideas (Pannucci & Williams, 2001). 
With regard to respondent bias, the researcher practiced and refined her interview techniques 
prior to conducting the interviews in order to avoid the use of leading questions and to 
conduct the interviews in an objective manner that gave the respondents comfort and freedom 
to express their views truthfully. The researcher also explained to the respondents that 
anonymity in responses would be strictly adhered to, which gave the respondents comfort to 
express their views openly and freely (Cannel & Henson, 1974, Paulhus, 1991).  
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In quantitative research, reliability refers to the replicability of results (Kirk & Miller, 1986; 
Joppe, 2000) and the consistency or accuracy of the research instruments (Roberts, Priest, & 
Traynor, 2006; Heale & Twycross, 2015). The reliability of the survey questionnaire was 
determined using Cronbach's alpha (Burns, 2000). Validity refers to the accuracy of 
measurement of a concept or how truthful the research findings are (Joppe, 2000; Roberts et 
al., 2006; Heale & Twycross, 2015). Content validity is the extent to which the items in an 
instrument capture or represents what is being measured (Onwuegbuzie et al, 2007).  In this 
study, the success factors included in the questionnaire were derived from the responses 
given by experts in the qualitative phase, enhancing content validity. External validity refers 
to generalisabiity of the study findings outside the setting of a study (Creswell, 2014).  The 
nature of this study and the fact that the sample was purposively selected, precludes the 
generalisability of its findings to another setting.  
 
3.6! Research Limitations 
 
One limitation of this study is the small sample sizes used for the interviews and survey 
questionnaire. This was due to difficulties in ascertaining the actual population size of IPP 
experts and key stakeholders and persuading practitioners with demanding work and life 
schedules to participate in the study. Larger sample sizes, particularly for the survey 
questionnaire, would be more representative and could enhance the quality of the research 
findings in investigating the CSFs for financing IPPs in Zimbabwe. A further limitation 
relates to the findings of this study. The CSFs identified are not robust but are dynamic and 
complex, in that they reflect the current country context of Zimbabwe. Should the 
macroeconomic and political context of Zimbabwe change, the CSFs will likely change as 
well. Therefore, the study’s findings are not explicitly generalizable in a different context or 
even at a later point in time in the future of Zimbabwe.  Another limitation of the study is the 
reliability of the data given by the experts in interviews. Although they possess the requisite 
experience and qualifications to speak authoritatively on the CSFs for IPPs, their opinions 
and responses cannot be independently verified and must be taken at face value by the 
researcher. The respondents might exaggerate or selectively remember or communicate 
certain information relative to the investigation, which can bias the research findings. 
 
The major limitations the researcher faced in conducting this study were limitations on time 
and access. Qualitative data collection and analysis is often complex and time consuming. 
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The limited time frame in which to complete this study hindered a more in depth and 
comprehensive analysis of the CSFs for Zimbabwe. In terms of access, the researcher did not 
have access to some potential participants because of their demanding work and travel 
schedules. Consequently, this limited the sample size for this study.  
 
3.7! Summary 
 
A mixed methods research strategy has been chosen for this study because a combination of 
the qualitative and quantitative techniques will address the research questions more 
accurately than either of the techniques independently. This chapter has also outlined and 
justified the study’s two phase exploratory sequential research design, the data sources, 
sampling techniques, data collection and data analysis methods. Methods to maximise data 
reliability and validity have also been described and the limitations of the research clearly 
stated. The next chapter will focus on presenting and discussing the findings of the qualitative 
first phase of the study. 
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4! QUALITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND 
INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT  
 
 
This chapter presents and analyses the findings from the semi-structured interviews 
conducted with experts on wide-ranging issues related to IPP financing and implementation. 
The first section focuses on respondents’ overall perception of the IPP landscape in 
Zimbabwe. The following section highlights specific themes about country level, project 
level and risk conditions that respondents have identified as responsible for the current low 
rate of investment in IPPs. This chapter also presents strategies proposed by experts to 
improve the rate of investment in IPPs and overall project implementation. The chapter 
concludes with the presentation of a list of success factors identified by the experts for 
financing IPPs. The major output of this analysis is the development of a survey instrument 
to assess the criticality and ranking of those success factors by stakeholders in the broader 
IPP sector in Zimbabwe.  
 
4.1! Description of Participants   
 
A total of fifteen qualitative face-to-face interviews were successfully conducted. At least one 
representative from each stakeholder grouping was interviewed in order to obtain balanced 
and representative findings. Table 5 below shows the split by stakeholder grouping of the 
respondents interviewed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The respondents had on average 15 years of experience in the energy sector, experience with 
at least two IPPs and the majority of respondents held senior positions within their 
organisations. A more detailed description of the respondent profiles is in Appendix D. 
Table 5: Stakeholder Grouping of Respondents 
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4.2! Overview of Private Participation in Generation in Zimbabwe 
 
There was unanimous agreement amongst respondents that the level of private participation in 
generation in Zimbabwe is far below what it could potentially be given the capacity shortfall 
in the country. In commenting about the level of private participation in generation, 
Respondent 10 stated that: 
 
“It is grossly inadequate. Just looking at the proportion of power in the country that is 
contributed by the private sector versus the maximum demand of the country, it is very low. It 
is nowhere near even one percent” 
  
Interestingly, nearly all the interviewees claimed that the low level of investment in IPPs is not 
due to a lack of investor interest. On the contrary, many respondents pointed out that there is a 
high level of investor interest in independent power generation, particularly from foreign 
investors. Regrettably however, the reality is that the high level of investor interest has not 
translated into similarly high level of actual investment activity. As one respondent observed:  
 
“In terms of actual real participation, we are very far, but in terms of excitement we are there. 
We have excited a number of key investors as a country but as far as realising real progress 
on the ground, not much has been made.” (Respondent 6) 
 
As captured in the quotation above, the low investment rate in IPPs in Zimbabwe is not as a 
result of a lack of investor interest, but the problem appears to be on the conditions on the 
ground that are not conducive for the realisation of actual investment.  
 
4.3! Factors impeding investment in IPPs  
 
This study makes a distinction between factors impeding investment and success factors. 
Factors impeding investment are the reasons identified by respondents as the underlying 
causes for the observed low rate of investment in IPPs. Success factors are those elements 
considered vital by respondents for creating an enabling environment for investment. The 
overlap between two is that some of the success factors are the mirror opposites of the factors 
impeding investment, while others are explicit, stand alone factors that have been identified. 
Respondents attributed the low rate of actual investment to a myriad of country level and 
project level factors. The major factors in each category are described below. 
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4.3.1! Country Level Factors 
!
4.3.1.1! Investment Climate  
 
All 15 interviewees cited an unfavourable investment climate as the primary reason for the 
low investment rate in IPPs in Zimbabwe. Although the investment climate is comprised of 
several elements, the major challenges most mentioned by respondents related to the poor 
macroeconomic environment, the political situation, enforceability of contracts, security of 
property rights and the country’s negative repayment record.  With regard to the 
macroeconomic conditions, respondents pointed out that prevailing liquidity challenges, low 
industry capacity utilization and weak domestic demand have limited potential returns and 
the incentive for investment for local and foreign investors. A weak macroeconomic 
environment casts doubt on the security of investment and makes investors hesitant to invest.  
 
“Right now investors come in and look at the risk that they are taking and like everyone else 
they think twice and take the wait and see approach”. (Respondent 6) 
 
Many of the IPP developers and advisors interviewed also stated that they faced significant 
difficulties in accessing international financing because of the country’s longstanding arrears 
to international lenders. Many lenders they have approached have taken the stance that until 
those arrears are resolved, no further financing would be released. 
 
4.3.1.2!Policy Uncertainty  
 
There was broad consensus amongst respondents that the policy framework governing private 
participation in generation is favourable. When asked about the impact of the indigenisation 
policy on investment in IPPs, the majority of interviewees responded that the policy had no 
material effect. “As for policy there are not many IPPs that have hit hurdles on policy issues. 
Our anticipation was that the indigenisation policy would affect the level of excitement but it 
is not evident in our discussion with IPPs that it is an issue.” (Respondent 6) 
 
However, the major concern expressed by all the private sector respondents with regard to 
policy is that of policy inconsistency, in particular, the inconsistent application of policy or 
retroactive changes to existing policies. This is echoed in the following statement made by 
Respondent 1:  
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“There have been a lot of knee-jerk reactions from government with regard to policy because 
some of the things they planned and anticipated have not been going according to plan. This 
makes policies very uncertain and makes it very difficult for us to plan for the future” 
(Respondent 1) 
 
The private sector respondents highlighted that because of the long-term nature of IPP 
financing and the immovability of the physical assets once an IPP is established, policy 
certainty and continuity are critical to give investors comfort that the structural and 
contractual arrangements underpinning their investments will remain legally enforceable.  
 
“IPP investments are long term and a long term perspective on policy and development 
would go a long way in unlocking investment.” (Respondent 2) 
 
The general sentiment amongst respondents is captured well in this statement by Respondent 
3: “There is no need to change the current policy and legal framework, there is need to 
enforce it.” (Respondent 3). 
 
4.3.1.3!Procurement Process 
 
There was universal agreement amongst the respondents that the current procurement 
framework of unsolicited bids had given rise to too many opportunists or speculators being 
awarded licenses as opposed to serious developers. 
 
“You do not get the best IPPs, you get the ones that you would not have ordinarily chosen. 
IPPs are sometimes awarded licenses based on the support they have and not on merit.” 
(Respondent 3) 
!
The respondents point out that this is one of the primary reasons why very few licensed 
projects have reached financial closure or been successfully implemented. Another important 
negative consequence of the procurement framework that was highlighted by three private 
sector respondents is the growing incidence of “bed blocking”. This refers to where viable 
project sites remain undeveloped because the license to develop that site was awarded to a 
speculator.!This was clearly articulated by Respondent 10 in the statement below:!
“The speculator has no real intention of developing the site, but holds on to it, effectively 
blocking that site from development even by serious developers, and often the speculator wants 
financial compensation to relinquish that site.”!(Respondent 10)!!
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As a result, the project remains undeveloped and investment on a viable site is foregone. 
 
4.3.1.4!Regulatory Inefficiencies and Delays 
 
Many respondents noted that the turnaround times in the licensing, PPA and generation tariff 
approval processes by the regulator are far too long. One respondent pointed out that such 
delays significantly stall the investment approval processes by financiers, who require the 
generation tariff to make their final investment decision, resulting in projects taking much 
longer to reach financial closure. Respondent 2 pointed out that such delays are particularly 
costly in an environment like Zimbabwe, which is in a state of flux. When asked whether 
respondents attributed these inefficiencies to a lack of technical skill amongst the personnel at 
the regulator, most respondents stated that they felt the personnel were adequately skilled but 
that the regulator might need to be further capacitated in terms of adding to the number of 
personnel. Another concern regarding the efficiency of the regulator expressed by Respondent 
10 was that the regulator has been inefficient in resolving the incidence of bed blocking by 
speculators.  
 
“This should be within the purview of the regulator to control and manage, but it has not been 
effective at all in this regard, possibly because they might have their hands tied due to political 
influence if the speculator(s) has strong political backing.” (Respondent 10) 
 
Many respondents also believed that the regulator is not immune from political interference in 
the licensing and tariff determination processes and that some inefficiencies such as the 
incidence of bed blocking and inconsistency in the application of the licensing and tariff 
framework are a result of political interference. One respondent pointed out that political 
interference is possible because the Energy Regulatory Act of 2011, that instituted the current 
regulator does not give the regulator full autonomy in the exercise of its role and function. 
 
“It was never structured to be independent. Section 35 of the Act reads “The Minister may give 
directions to the Commission relating to the policy the Commission has to observe in the 
exercise of its functions, including in particular relating to tariffs chargeable by licensees.” 
This particular clause does not make the regulator fully independent.” (Respondent 3) 
 
One respondent noted that one of the consequences of this political interference is that the 
regulator has the tendency to prioritise government projects over IPPs, with government 
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projects experiencing shorter turn around times in licensing and tariff approval processes and 
on average being awarded higher tariffs than IPPs, particularly for solar.   
 
4.3.1.5!Tariff Framework  
 
All 15 respondents noted the tariff framework as one of the major hindrances to investment in 
IPPs. The major issue with regard to the tariff for most respondents was political interference 
in the determination of the tariffs awarded. Respondent 10 points out, 
 
“In many cases IPPs are given a tariff that doesn’t adequately reflect the cost of the project – 
possibly due to political interference to keep tariffs at a particular level.” (Respondent 10) 
 
Another issue raised by respondents was the inconsistent application of the tariff methodology. 
The official tariff methodology is a cost plus methodology but some respondents noted that 
what the regulator applies is a hybrid of the cost plus methodology and Renewable Energy 
Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) methodology and in some instances, purely the REFIT methodology, 
even though the REFIT methodology has not yet been approved by government. As a result, 
the tariffs awarded are not fully cost reflective, which makes it difficult for IPPs to secure 
financing because the tariff is not bankable for investors. One criticism of the cost plus 
methodology raised by two public sector respondents was that they felt it fostered inefficiencies 
in the cost structure of IPPs because it leaves room for IPPs to simply pass costs on to 
consumers without interrogating ways to reduce costs further. 
 
Nearly all respondents expressed concern over the fact that the final retail tariff was highly 
controlled by government. They highlighted that the final tariff is not reflective of the offtaker’s 
cost structure, which is a threat to the solvency of the offtaker that could hinder its ability to 
pay for the power it procures, including power from IPPs. They also highlighted that the final 
tariff reinforced the offtaker’s natural monopoly power, preventing IPPs from selling power 
directly to consumers like large intensive users, because IPPs cannot compete on price.  
 
4.3.2! Project Level Factors  
 
4.3.2.1!Quality of Developers 
 
All the respondents from the investor stakeholder grouping stated that one of the primary 
hindrances to investment in IPPs is the quality of IPP developers that approach their 
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institutions for funding. They highlighted two critical aspects with regard to the quality of 
developers. Firstly, that many of the developers lack the requisite technical and business 
skills and experience to execute the projects, which affects the ability of developers to 
“convert their development work into a viable project.” (Respondent 1). Nearly all of the 
respondents acknowledged that in Zimbabwe, there are only a few development companies 
with solid teams and a strong track record. Secondly, respondents highlighted that many of 
the developers do not have the financial capability to contribute or raise the counterpart 
funding that may be required for the project. Consequently, as pointed out by one respondent, 
“projects are not seeing the light of day because the developers cannot raise their end or 
share of the funding”. (Respondent 1)   
 
4.3.2.2!Poor project preparation 
 
Poor project preparation was cited by all the respondents in the investor stakeholder grouping 
as a major factor hindering investment in IPPs in Zimbabwe.  One respondent stated that in 
most cases, developers approach investors for funding with badly done feasibility studies, 
that are essentially just ideas and concepts, without any concrete technical and business 
fundamentals to form the basis for an investment decision by investors to invest in the 
project. One investor pointed out that in the very worst cases, some developers have 
approached them with just the generation license and no feasibility study at all! 
 
“We have seen more than 20 IPP projects looking for financing. They come through with 
their license and think that it is enough to secure investment. It is clear they do not 
understand what a financier requires or what conditions must be met before financing is 
released. When we then present them with the requirements we need prior to releasing 
financing such as a bankable feasibility study and an EIA certificate we lose each other.!This 
to me highlights their insincerity, inexperience and incompetency to carry out the project.!! 
(Respondent 1)  
 
4.3.2.3!High Development Costs 
 
Another significant factor hindering investment in IPPs highlighted by all the respondents in 
the developer stakeholder grouping is the high costs associated with developing the project to 
a bankable state that investors can consider investing in. As one respondent pointed out, 
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“To get the project to a bankable state requires a significant amount of money – for the best 
lawyers, financial and technical advisors etc. An important element for financing is the 
financial model, and hiring a good corporate finance house is essential in order to get a 
decent model, which costs money” (Respondent 1)!  
 
Besides advisory fees, developers face the cost of licensing and other statutory fees. In 
particular, the fees required to secure an environmental impact assessment (EIA) certificate 
from the Environmental Management Authority (EMA) were highlighted by most developers 
as being unreasonably high. Most developers do not have the financial resources to fund all 
the development costs on their own and face significant difficulties in raising the financing 
from banks and other financial institutions.  Respondent 14 pointed out that for larger 
projects, development costs can stall a project completely because they increase in proportion 
to the size of the project. For very large projects, these costs can become quite significant, 
and as a result, none of the larger projects have gotten off the ground.  
 
4.3.2.4!Depth of local capital markets and lack of understanding about energy 
infrastructure investments 
 
There was consensus amongst respondents that the current liquidity challenges facing the 
country have significantly constrained the domestic market’s ability to finance energy 
projects. Energy infrastructure projects have long life spans and require long term money, 
that most commercial banks are currently unable to give. Institutional investors such as 
pension funds and insurance companies have the ability to go long, because their books are 
largely comprised of long term policy holders, but they too are limited with regard to the 
amount of financing they can avail for energy projects.  This is clearly echoed in the 
statement below:  
 
“Power projects by nature require huge capital outlays in US dollars and because of the 
current macro environment dollars are in short supply domestically, therefore any 
development will require foreign partners. In most cases the domestic market does not have 
the ability to provide all the required financing on its own. The typical funding split by source 
for most projects is 70/30, 30 percent domestic, 70% percent foreign.” (Respondent 1) 
 
Most of the IPPs in Zimbabwe use project finance structures to finance their projects because 
of the high level of country risk, and the 70:30 debt equity ratio is the typical ratio used in 
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project finance transactions. Furthermore, most investors are not willing to go beyond 
seventy percent debt because the IPP industry is still in its infancy. This fact coupled with 
country risk, heightens repayment risk for investors.   
 
Another reason for the low rate of investment in energy projects by local investors 
highlighted by Respondent 2, is that local capital markets have no prior experience with 
financing energy projects and as a result, do not fully understand energy infrastructure as an 
asset class. The majority of local investors are therefore hesitant to make any investments in 
IPPs. 
 
4.3.2.5!Inadequate Government Support 
 
There was unanimous consensus amongst all respondents that there is inadequate government 
support for IPPs. Respondent 4 explained that there are two stages in the development of an 
IPP where government support is critical: the licensing and permitting stage; and the financing 
stage. Most respondents agreed that for licensing and permitting stage, which is dictated by 
policy and the legal framework, government support was satisfactory.  
 
“In terms of policy, government has been very supportive. The policies around IPPs and IPP 
development are very good. Therefore, government has been very supportive in that respect.” 
(Respondent 10)  
 
For the financing phase, which is predominantly driven by investors’ perception of country 
risk, all the respondents acknowledged that government support falls incredibly short. Most 
developers do not have the resources to develop the projects on their own, nor can the domestic 
capital market provide all the financing required. As a result, IPPs will require foreign 
investment to execute their projects. In order to attract foreign investment, security of 
repayment is necessary. This is a critical issue because Zimbabwe’s negative economic 
situation causes investors to doubt the security of their investment and require significant 
guarantees for investment. Policy guarantees are available for IPPs but this has been on a case 
by case basis and has not been guaranteed to all IPPs. Moreover, policy guarantees do not 
adequately cover the other risks associated with investing in the country such as economic risk 
and political risk. Investors often require a sovereign guarantee to cover overall country risk, 
but this type of guarantee is currently not available for IPPs as government’s position is that 
sovereign guarantees are only given for public private partnership (PPP) projects, where private 
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investors partner with state owned institutions to carry out projects. One respondent from a 
government department explained the rationale behind this position: 
 
“Government does not give sovereign guarantees for purely private sector projects. The 
thinking is that as IPPs these projects are private sector driven and the private sector should 
have the requisite skills and know how to source financing for their projects” The role of 
government is to purely create an enabling environment, which it has through the policy and 
legal framework” (Respondent 15). 
 
A major concern related to government support highlighted by some private sector 
respondents was that in their interaction with some government authorities and in some 
instances the utility, there is a negative attitude towards the private sector. They highlighted 
that to a large extent, government views the private sector with suspicion and apprehension, 
even though with regard to IPPs, every aspect of their development is under the scrutiny of 
the regulator.  
 
Respondents also highlighted that other forms of government support such as National 
Project Status, which is exemption from import duties and granting of certain tax exemptions, 
are not readily granted to all IPPs. As one respondent put it, “Securing or being given this 
status is not easy or guaranteed, and is solely at the government’s discretion.” (Respondent 
10) 
 
Although respondents acknowledged that government was constrained with regard to the form 
of support they can give, for example, no ability to give commercial guarantees, most 
respondents pointed out that more can be done by government to support IPPs and that 
government has not yet exhausted all their options.  
 
4.3.3! Summary of factors and risks that contribute to the low rate of investment in 
IPPs 
 
A full list of the factors that impede investment identified by respondents can be found in 
Appendix D.  
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4.4! Main risks to investment in IPPs 
 
During the interviews, respondents were also asked to identify the major risks for financing 
IPPs in Zimbabwe. Table 6 below highlights the identified risks, their descriptions and the 
number of respondents who highlighted a particular risk during the interviews. 
 
Table 6: Main Risks for IPP investment in Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
4.5! Strategies recommended by participants to increase the rate of investment 
in IPPs  
 
Respondents were asked what specific strategies, if any, they would suggest or recommend to 
increase the rate of investment in IPPs and improve the overall project implementation of 
IPPs in Zimbabwe. Table 7 highlights some of the strategies recommended by the 
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respondents. These strategies comprised of suggestions on how to overcome the current 
bottlenecks to financing and explicit recommendations of key success factors that could act 
as a catalyst for investment in IPPs.  
 
Table 7: Recommended Strategies by Respondents  
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A more exhaustive list of the recommendations given by respondents can be found in 
Appendix D. 
 
4.6! Identified Success Factors  
 
During the interviews, respondents were asked to identify success factors that they deemed 
important for the financing of IPPs. Other factors were identified by the researcher through 
thematic qualitative analysis of the interview transcripts. The majority of factors were 
broadly in line with literature on CSFs for power projects, but some factors were unique to 
the local country context, such as “reduction of country debt overhang”, “ability to export 
power regionally” and “financial education about energy infrastructure as an asset class for 
domestic investors”. A total of 40 individual success factors were identified. These factors 
can be grouped under six principal headings that relate to certain aspects of the development 
of IPPs, namely investment climate, power sector characteristics, project economic viability, 
strength of financial package, people factors and government support.  
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4.6.1! Country Investment Climate  
 
As intimated in the literature review, a country’s investment climate plays a key role in 
determining IPP investment outcomes. Respondents pointed out that stable macro economic 
policies and certainty about upholding of contracts were critical to unlocking both local and 
foreign investment in IPPs!because any economic instability or uncertainty makes investors 
doubt the security of their investment and their ability to earn an adequate return. In light of 
the fact that domestic capital markets are highly constrained, many respondents emphasized 
the need for steps to be taken to improve international investor’s perception of the country as 
an investment destination, namely reducing the country’s debt overhang and steps towards a 
credit rating for Zimbabwe, in order to unlock much needed foreign investment.  
 
4.6.2! Power Sector Characteristics 
 
Respondents pointed out that certain characteristics of the country’s power sector have 
hindered investment in IPPs and that to catalyse investment, changes to the status quo in the 
sector were critical. Respondents identified a total of 8 success factors related to the country’s 
power sector arrangements that if introduced or implemented would attract more in 
investment in IPPs. These included a transparent, cost reflective tariff framework, the 
introduction of competitive bidding practices to procure IPPs to enhance cost efficiency, 
formulation of a comprehensive national energy strategic plan to focus policy initiatives and 
solidify the role of IPPs in the generation mix of the country, consistent and fair regulation to 
enforce policy and create certainty about tariffs and market access and further unbundling of 
the offtaker to increase competition in supply and lower cost and operational inefficiencies in 
distribution. 
 
4.6.3! Project Economic Viability 
Economic viability forms the basis of investment case and ultimately determines the success 
of the project. Prior to investment, investors assess the economic viability of a project and the 
sustainability of expected returns. If a project is not economically viable, no investment will 
take place. Several success factors that determine the economic viability of an IPP project 
were identified by respondents. These included a bankable feasibility study, which is 
essentially the business case for financing, the expected debt paying ability of project, a 
reasonable, fair expected return on equity, project size, an operationally efficient and solvent 
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offtaker and the quality of the technical partner. Respondents also highlighted the need for a 
solid risk allocation, management and mitigation plan to safeguard investment and promote 
the sustainability of returns. With regard to project size, respondents pointed out that because 
of the current challenging economic environment and the fact that the IPP industry is a 
nascent industry, the execution of medium to large projects is very difficult as they entail 
higher capital outlays, upfront fees, risk and more stringent financing conditions than smaller 
projects. Starting at a smaller initial capacity makes project execution easier and provides a 
valuable learning experience for developers. Notably, some respondents highlighted that the 
common factor amongst all the operational IPPs in Zimbabwe that are supplying the grid is 
that they started small and have since successfully scaled up their operations. 
4.6.4! Strength of Financial Package 
IPPs are predominantly financed using project finance, which is limited or non recourse 
financing.  Because investors’ recourse is limited to the cash flows generated by the project, 
securing those cash flows is critical for investors. Measures to secure project revenues 
identified by respondents were the use of escrow accounts and ring fencing of offtaker 
receivables. Another important consideration for successfully financing IPPs highlighted by 
respondents was the overall cost of financing, which is largely determined by quality and 
origin of investors. Respondents pointed out that domestic capital is often cheaper and easier 
to secure than foreign capital because local investors have a better understanding of country 
risk and more avenues to get around it. As a result, the use domestic capital in financing IPPs 
could lower the overall cost of financing. In order to unlock domestic capital for IPP 
investment, some respondents identified financial education about energy infrastructure as an 
asset class for local investors as a key success factor. Other success factors related to the 
strength of the financial package identified by respondents included project exemptions from 
tax and duties and a well functioning domestic financial markets and banking system. 
4.6.5! People Factors 
One of the major risks to financing IPPs highlighted by respondents was people or developer 
risk. Several success factors to mitigate this risk and to enhance the ability of IPP developers 
to successfully convert their development work into a viable project were identified by 
respondents. These included the experience and competency of the developer, the quality of 
local equity partners, skilled and experienced advisors and financial innovation and creativity 
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by development teams in structuring financing arrangements. Another critical success factor 
mentioned by all the respondents was the ability of the project sponsors to effectively manage 
and maintain good stakeholder relationships, particularly with government. One respondent 
pointed out that most politicians do not fully understand the business dynamics of IPPs or the 
challenges facing developers. As a result, any concessions IPPs may desire from government 
will depend largely on the ability of IPPs to lobby government and effective communication 
between the private sector and government.  
4.6.6! Government Support 
There was unanimous agreement amongst respondents that government support was a critical 
success factor for financing IPPs, and in particular, government support in the form of 
sovereign guarantee to mitigate country risk. Respondents highlighted that most foreign 
investors require sovereign guarantees as part of their conditions precedent to financing. 
Policy continuity was another major concern for investors and developers. Respondents also 
identified a policy guarantee agreement as another necessary success factor for financing 
IPPs, as it gives investors and developers alike comfort concerning policy continuity and the 
security of their investment with regard to no expropriation and currency conversion. Another 
success factor related to government support highlighted by respondents in the IPP developer 
stakeholder grouping was better coordination between the government departments 
responsible for the various permits and consents required for IPPs, in order to reduce 
inefficiencies and lengthy turn around times that can significantly delay the attainment of 
financial closure.  
Table 8 below presents the full list of identified success factors. 
Table 8: Success Factors for Financing IPPs in Zimbabwe 
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4.7! Development of Survey Instrument  
 
The identified success factors identified were used to create a survey instrument to 
quantitatively explore the criticality and ranking of those factors. The survey comprised five 
sections (see Appendix C). The first section was an introductory letter, explaining the 
research objectives and giving the researcher’s contact details. The second section solicited 
demographic information about the respondents, namely their affiliation, years of experience 
and the type of energy projects they have been involved in. In section three, respondents were 
asked to indicate their level of agreement with general statements about the energy sector in 
Zimbabwe using a Likert-type scale with six options (not applicable, strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree and strongly agree). Section four required respondents to rate the 
importance of each of the 40 success factors identified in phase one using a five-point Likert 
scale, where one is ‘not critical’ and five is ‘most critical’. The last section required 
respondents to rank seven risk factors identified in phase one according to degree of threat for 
IPP investments in Zimbabwe, where one represents the highest threat and seven the lowest 
threat. 
 
4.8! Summary 
 
There was unanimous agreement amongst respondents that the level of investment in IPPs is 
Zimbabwe is far below its potential. A weak investment climate, policy uncertainty, the 
procurement process, inconsistent regulation and inadequate government support were some 
of the major factors identified as impeding investment. Respondents also identified 40 
success factors for IPPs in Zimbabwe were identified. Most of the factors were in line with 
literature, but some factors were unique to national context such as “reduction of country debt 
overhang”, “ability to export power regionally” and “financial education about energy 
infrastructure as an asset class for domestic investors”. This chapter also outlines the 
development of the survey instrument to be used in the quantitative second phase of the 
study. Chapter 5 will focus on the presentation and analysis of  the findings of the 
quantitative phase of the study.  
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5! QUANTITATIVE RESEASRCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS  
 
5.1! Questionnaire Response Rate  
 
A total of 45 questionnaires were sent out to target respondents. 38 completed 
questionnaires were returned, denoting a response rate of 84%. Of the returned 
questionnaires, two were incomplete and consequently excluded from the analysis, yielding 
an effective response rate of 80%.  
 
5.2! Participant Demographics  
 
A summary of the demographic characteristics of the questionnaire respondents is shown in 
Table 9 below.  
 
Table 9: Respondent Demographics  
 
 
The respondents were also asked to indicate the type of IPP projects that they had been 
involved in. The chart below gives a summary of the different types of IPP projects that the 
respondents have been involved in. 
 
Figure 6: Respondent Experience with IPPs  
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5.3! Test of Reliability – Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
The value of Cronbach’s Alpha for the collected survey data is 0.896. This is greater than the 
conventional acceptable range of values for alpha of between 0.6 and 0.8, indicating that the 
questionnaire for this study is reliable and internally consistent (Nunally, 1978; Pallant 2001). 
 
5.4! Descriptive Statistics of Survey Data 
 
SPSS was used to calculate key descriptive statistics for the data, namely the mean, standard 
deviation, variance, skewness and kurtosis. The summary of the statistics is in Appendix E. 
Based on mean scores, 38 out of the 40 CSFs were perceived as either ‘critical’ or ‘more 
critical’ for the successful financing of IPPs in Zimbabwe by respondents, with mean scores 
greater than or equal to 3. As explained in Chapter 3, a score of 3 on the Likert scale used in 
this study denotes a critical factor. The two factors not perceived as critical were “further 
unbundling of the offtaker” and the “origin of investors”.  
 
The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of the data was statistically significant for each of the 40 
factors because the p-values for the tests on each factor were all less than 0.05 (See Output in 
Appendix E). This provides strong evidence that the data is not normally distributed and as a 
result, non-parametric statistical techniques are the most appropriate for analysing the data. 
 
5.5! Perceptions about IPPs and the energy sector in Zimbabwe 
 
In the first part of the survey, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or 
disagreement with ten statements about IPPs and the energy sector in Zimbabwe that capture 
some of the perceptions about the energy sector identified during interviews, in order to 
examine whether the perceptions held by the interviewees could be generalised to the broader 
IPP stakeholder community. A summary of their responses is given in Table 10 overleaf. 
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Table 10: Summary of Respondents Perceptions   
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As Table 10 shows, the majority of respondents were satisfied with the laws and policy 
framework for private participation in generation and were in agreement that there is investor 
appetite for IPP projects in Zimbabwe, which closely mirrors the findings of the expert 
interviews conducted in the first phase of the study. The highest level of agreement, for 
which 67% of respondents answered ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’, was tied on two statements, 
namely that project development costs are unreasonably high and that there is a need to 
further unbundle the offtaker. The result concerning the need to further unbundle the offtaker 
is a surprising because it was one of two factors that were not perceived as critical using the 
Likert scale. A closer look at the proportion of private and public sector respondents who 
were in agreement with the statement shows an almost even split, indicating consensus 
between the two sectors. This suggests that there is a need to further restructure the electricity 
market, that both the private and public sector acknowledge, but when considered with all the 
other elements that need to be implemented to encourage investment it ranks lower in 
priority. 
 
The statement with the highest level of disagreement concerned the unsolicited bid 
procurement framework being the most optimal for Zimbabwe, with 58% of respondents 
disagreeing with the statement and 16% agreeing that the framework was optimal. Looking at 
proportion of private and public sector respondents who disagreed, the split is almost even: 
52% versus 48% in favour of the public sector. This result lends weight to some of the 
criticisms of the framework highlighted by interviewees, one of which is that it has resulted 
in a high incidence of speculators as opposed to serious developers. The majority of 
respondents also disagreed that there is a clear separation between the regulator and the line 
ministry. Notably, of those who disagreed, the majority were private sector respondents. This 
indicates that the private sector in particular, does not perceive the regulator as independent, 
but susceptible to political interference in the discharge of its duties, which could result in 
suboptimal outcomes. The results concerning these two statements points to the need for 
further clarity and transparency in the procurement process for IPPs and the need for full 
autonomy of the regulator in the discharge of its duties. 
 
Opinion was split almost evenly on three statements, that policy was accurately and 
consistently applied, that the current tariff methodology generated a cost reflective tariff and 
that there is adequate government support for IPPs. Notably, each of these statements relates 
to areas within the specific purview of government and over which IPPs have no control.   
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Analysis of the results by sector reveals some interesting results. With regard to policy being 
accurately and consistently applied, an overwhelming majority of respondents who agreed 
with this statement were from the public sector.  On the other hand, an overwhelming 
majority of private sector respondents disagreed with the statement. This is in line with the 
perception of private sector interviewees in the first phase, who identified policy 
inconsistency as one of the factors impeding investment. Similar polarity is observed in the 
results for the statement that there is adequate government support for IPPs. 93% of the 
respondents who disagreed with this statement belonged to the private sector, while 77% of 
those that agreed that there was adequate support were from the public sector. This indicates 
a clear divide in perception between the private and public sectors regarding the 
implementation of policy and the form and magnitude of government support necessary for 
IPPs. 
 
The only statement for which opinion is still split, even by sector, was that the current tariff 
methodology results in a tariff that is cost reflective. Analysing those who disagree, there was 
a 50:50 split between the private and public sectors. For those who agreed however, private 
sector respondents had a moderate majority. The qualitative findings may provide some 
explanation of the split in opinion on this statement. The official tariff methodology is a cost 
plus methodology, which all things equal, should be cost reflective, as it is a tariff derived 
from the actual costs of the project. However, interviewees pointed out that the regulator also 
uses a REFIT guideline in conjunction with the official methodology. This split in opinion is 
likely symptomatic of the negative impact on the tariff as a result of tension between the two 
methodologies being used. 
 
5.6! Significance Indices and Rank of Critical Success Factors  
 
5.6.1! Overall Respondents Perception 
 
The relative importance index (RII) of each of the 40 CSFs was calculated based on the 
overall survey responses. The CSFs were then ranked according to their RIIs. Table 11 below 
presents the RIIs and ranking of the top five and bottom five CSFs for the successful 
financing of IPPs in Zimbabwe. The full list of rankings can be found in Appendix E. 
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Table 11: Significance Indices and Rank of Critical Success Factors for Total Sample 
 
 
 
Based on the RIIs, the top five most critical factors according to all the respondents are 1) 
“Expected debt paying ability of the project”; 2) “Transparent, cost reflective tariff 
framework”; 3) “Upholding of contracts”; 4) “Reasonable, fair expected return on equity” 
and 5) “Bankable feasibility study”. Four of these factors relate to the economic viability of 
the project. The five least influential factors according to respondents were “Origin of 
investors”, “Further unbundling of the offtaker”, “Program Champion for IPPs”, “Project 
exemptions from tax and duties” and “Ability of IPPs to lobby government”.   
 
The results also reveal clustering of factors related to project economic viability (seven out of 
ten), the investment climate (three out of five) and government support (two out of five) in 
the top twenty CSFs as ranked by respondents. This suggests that project economic viability, 
the investment climate and government support are the three principal areas in which things 
should be got right in order to unlock investment in IPPs. The bottom twenty ranked factors 
showed a predominant clustering of factors related to power sector characteristics (5 out of 8) 
and people factors (5 out of 7). Clusters of factors related to the strength of the financial 
package can be seen both in the top 20 and bottom 20 ranked factors.  
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5.6.2! CSF Rankings by Sector – Private versus Public  
 
Tables 12 below presents the RII and rank of the top five CSFs from the private and public 
sectors perspective. The full list of rankings by sector can be found in Appendix E. 
 
Table 12: Private and Public Sector RIIs and Ranking of Critical Success Factors  
 
 
 
The top three most critical factors according to the private sector are “Upholding of 
contracts”, “Expected debt paying ability of project” and an “Operationally efficient and 
solvent offtaker”. “Reasonable, fair expected return on equity” and “Cost of financing 
(WACC)” were tied at ranked four. For the public sector, the most critical success factor is 
“Transparent, cost reflective tariff framework”. Tied at rank two were “Expected debt paying 
ability of project” and “Competent, consistent and fair regulator”, while “Stable 
macroeconomic policies” and “Comprehensive national energy strategic plan” were tied at 
rank four. Comparing the two sectors top five rankings, the private sector ranked factors 
related to the economic viability of the project and the strength of the financial package as 
most critical, whereas the public sector ranked factors related to the power sector 
characteristics as most critical. The only factor for which there was agreement in the ranking 
between the two sectors was “Expected debt paying ability of project”. 
 
 
 79 
 
5.7! Agreement Analysis 
 
In order to determine the level of agreement in the perceptions of the private and public 
sectors regarding the importance of the CSFs, Kendall’s concordance test is conducted using 
SPSS. The output of the test can be found in Appendix E. The Kendall’s concordance test is 
appropriate because the data is not normally distributed as shown in section 5.4 above. 
Kendall’s tau is 0.305 suggesting weak concordance between the rankings of the private and 
public sector respondents. The p –value for Kendall’s tau is 0.007. Because this value is less 
than 0.05, we can conclude that there is statistically significant concordance between the 
private and public sector rankings of the CSFs. 
 
In order to determine the actual level of agreement or disagreement between the private and 
public sector respondents, the RAF, PD and PA for the CSFs were calculated. The results of 
the agreement analysis are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Agreement Analysis of Ranking of CSFs between the Private and Public Sector 
 
 
 
The percentage agreement (PA) for the CSFs between the two sectors is 40%. The percentage 
agreement is only 40%, there is low agreement in the ranking of CSFs indicating that there is 
a significant level of disagreement in the perception of the private and public sector ranking 
of the CSFs between the private and public sector.  
   
5.8! Risk Factor Analysis 
 
Respondents were asked to rank seven main risk factors identified during the expert 
interviews according to the degree of threat for IPP investments in Zimbabwe. The ranking of 
the seven risk factors according to their responses is illustrated in table 14 below. 
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Table 14: Risk Factor Ranking 
 
 
 
Country risk, payment risk and repayment risk were rated as the top three risks for IPP 
investments in Zimbabwe. Analysing the rankings by sector, both the private and public 
sector ranked country risk as the biggest threat to IPP investment in Zimbabwe. This 
underscores the importance of risk mitigation strategies around country risk for unlocking 
investment. Similarly, payment risk and repayment risk were both in the top three ranked 
risks for both sectors. Where there was a significant difference in ranking was with regard to 
developer risk. The private sector respondents ranked this risk fifth, but for the public sector 
this was the second biggest threat to investment in IPPs after country risk. This is a 
significant result. It suggests that the public sector do not have confidence in the ability of 
licensed developers to effectively develop their projects to a bankable state. The low ranking 
of developer risk by the private sector might be indicative of the private sector’s ability to 
mitigate this risk through the use of skilled advisors, which was also identified as a critical 
success factor. 
 
5.9! Summary 
 
38 of the 40 factors identified in the qualitative phase of the study were perceived as critical 
for financing IPPs by survey respondents. The most critical success factor was the expected 
debt paying ability of the project. The ranking of factors by the private sector differs from the 
rankings assigned by the public sector. Statistical analyses revealed 40 percent agreement 
between the private and public sector in the ranking of CSFs. Country risk was perceived as 
the most significant threat to investment in IPPs. These results have particular implications 
on the development of IPPs in Zimbabwe that are discussed in chapter 6. 
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6! DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter will discuss the research findings and analysis presented in chapters 4 and 5  
and discuss their implications on the development of IPPs in Zimbabwe. The chapter will 
conclude by presenting the conclusions to the study’s research questions and objectives. 
 
6.1! Discussion of Results 
 
The IPP industry in Zimbabwe is still very young and as with any nascent industry, teething 
problems can be expected. However, IPP developers in Zimbabwe are not only contending 
with the normal growing pains of a developing industry, but have also had to navigate an 
extremely challenging economic environment. Notwithstanding the challenges, there are a 
significant number of investors who want to invest in Zimbabwe and specifically in the 
energy sector. Despite this interest, however, actual investment in IPPs remains muted. The 
aim of this study was to understand why this has been the case and to identify factors that can 
contribute towards increased investment in IPPs. 
 
As a starting point, this study explored the current IPP context and the findings have revealed 
several factors that have contributed to the status quo. These included a poor investment 
climate, policy uncertainty, the lack of experience of developers, poor project preparation, 
regulatory inefficiencies and inadequate government support. Analysed individually, these 
factors may seem disconnected, but viewed in tandem, the combined effect of these factors is 
that they have increased the uncertainty surrounding the sustainability and security of 
investment in IPPs for potential investors, causing investors to shy away from investing, 
resulting in the observed low investment rate in IPPs in Zimbabwe. This observation is 
consistent with literature on investment under uncertainty (McDonald & Siegel, 1986; Dixit 
& Pindyck, 1994), which predicts that when there is uncertainty, investors will choose to 
delay investment until there is more clarity about future prospects.  
 
Drawing on the experience of expert stakeholders in the IPP sector in Zimbabwe, forty 
success factors that are important for successfully financing IPPs in the local context were 
identified. These factors related to six elements that are vital in creating an enabling 
environment for investment in IPPs namely: the need for a stable macroeconomic 
environment; the influence of the power market structure; the importance of project 
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economic viability; the strength of the financial package; the significance of having the right 
people; and the criticality of government support. Quantitative analysis showed that of the 40 
factors, 38 factors were perceived as critical success factors by respondents. In terms of the 
ranking of factors, factors related to project economic viability, the investment climate and 
government support were the most critical for unlocking investment. The expected debt 
paying ability of the project was ranked the most critical factor for financing IPPs by all 
stakeholders. This finding is not surprising because debt financing is the predominant form of 
financing for greenfield IPPs and investors will only invest in a project with adequate cash 
flows to pay its debt service.   
 
A transparent and cost reflective tariff framework was ranked the second most critical 
success factor. For energy projects like IPPs the tariff is the sole driver of revenue and the 
key determinant of the project’s ability to repay its debt and investor returns. Linked to this is 
the importance of a transparent, competent and fair regulator, as the responsibility of 
formulating and enforcing the tariff framework lies squarely on the regulator. As pointed out 
by Eberhard et al. (2016), the quality of regulation and not merely the existence of regulation 
is what is critical for unlocking investment for IPPs.  This study revealed significant 
stakeholder dissatisfaction with the the regulator’s performance in the discharge of its duties. 
Ambiguity with respect to the independence of the regulator was cited as the possible root 
cause of observed regulatory inefficiencies. The importance of independent regulation cannot 
be overstated. Without independence, the regulator is susceptible to making arbitrary 
decisions as a result of political interference, that increase regulatory risk, reduce investor 
confidence and ultimately hinder investment. This strongly suggests that strengthening the 
capacity and independence of the regulator must be made a priority if meaningful progress is 
to be made. 
 
A success factor identified in this study but not explicitly highlighted in other studies on 
CSFs for power projects was that of the influence of project size on investment outcomes. 
Due to the high risk perception of the country, execution of larger projects has been complex 
and requirements for financing difficult to meet. Phased implementation of IPPs, which begin 
with a small initial plant capacity, has a de-risking effect that enables developers to raise 
financing for expansion to a larger plant size, leveraging the already operational smaller 
plant. This finding is important because it provides a possible explanation as to why all the 
IPPs licensed for projects with large capacities in Zimbabwe have not reached financial 
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closure. It also suggests that phased implementation might be a faster method to develop IPPs 
and procure much needed generation capacity and reinforce long term energy security for the 
country. This strategy could have application not only in Zimbabwe but in similarly 
perceived high risk developing countries.  
 
One of the objectives of this study was to determine whether there was agreement between 
the private and the public sector rankings of CSFs. The results showed low agreement 
between the private and public sector in the ranking of CSFs. The only ranking which was 
exactly the same was for the success factor “expected debt paying ability of the project”. For 
the rest of the success factors there was wide disparity in their perceived importance between 
the two sectors. This lack of accord and harmonization between the private and public sectors 
regarding what is important for realising investment is potentially a bigger risk for IPPs in 
Zimbabwe than any of the other risks highlighted in this study. Even concerning the factor 
“expected debt paying ability of the project”, the difficulties in securing debt financing that 
IPPs are currently experiencing highlight that even though both sectors are agreed on the 
relative importance of a project’s ability to pay back debt, there is likely no agreement on 
what constitutes the “expected debt paying ability of the project” and what is necessary from 
an enabling environment perspective for a project to achieve this. Moreover, if the air of 
suspicion and apprehension highlighted in the qualitative findings persists in the interactions 
between the private and public sector, no meaningful progress in towards catalysing 
investment in the energy sector will be made.  This underscores the importance for effective 
dialogue between the two sectors.  
 
Although this study’s results show that open and effective communication between the two 
sectors is perceived as a critical success factor for investment, in terms of ranking, both 
sectors do not perceive it as a priority. It is this researcher’s opinion that this factor should 
have been rated the most critical because it is the necessary first step towards the realisation 
of all the other success factors highlighted in this study. Effective communication between 
the private and public sector was one of the reasons behind the success of the SA REIPPP 
(Eberhard et a., 2016). As the authors point out, from the onset of the program, there was 
dialogue between the Department of Energy IPP unit and the private sector, particularly the 
lenders, on key issues concerning the program (Eberhard et a., 2016). It is this researcher’s 
opinion that similar dialogue between the private sector and government in Zimbabwe will 
 84 
 
facilitate improved investment outcomes, and that the best placed agent to facilitate deeper 
discussion between the two stakeholders is the line ministry.  
 
Notably, the most pronounced disparity in ranking was on the factors related to government 
support in the form of guarantees. Sovereign guarantees were perceived as a CSF for 
investment by the private sector and not the public sector. Similarly, policy guarantees were 
ranked as the 9th CSF by the private sector, but only ranked 32nd by the public sector. As 
highlighted in the qualitative findings, government’s stance is that the private sector is 
adequately skilled to execute and finance the projects without the assistance of government. 
However, the private sector’s request for government guarantees is merited. As pointed out in 
literature, it is rare for infrastructure projects to be financed entirely on merit without any 
form of guarantees due to the non-recourse nature of the financing and the irreversibility of 
investment (Nevitt & Fabozzi, 1995; Ehlers, 2014). Government may not be able to give the 
private sector all the concessions they request for, but what is important is that government 
listen to the private sector. Financiers always opt for sovereign guarantees but there are a host 
of other viable risk mitigation and credit enhancements that can be employed. One 
recommendation made by one of the respondents in this study was the use of concessional 
financing from friends of the country such as China by government, to provide guarantees 
against which IPPs can access debt financing in capital markets. However, without an open 
ear to the private sector, many viable suggestions as to how government support can be 
provided to the private sector cannot be brought forward.  
 
Another interesting point of disparity between the perception of the private and public sector 
was concerning the importance of a competitive bidding framework as CSF for investment in 
IPPs. The private sector ranked this factor 39th out of the total 40 factors, whereas the public 
sector ranked it 9th. This result is surprising, given that inefficiencies in the current 
procurement framework was identified as one of the factors impeding investment by 
interviewees and that the merits of competitive bidding practices, particularly with regard to 
efficiency, price and transparency, are well documented in literature (Eberhard et al., 2016). 
There are several plausible explanations for this. One explanation is that private sector 
respondents, and in particular developers, dislike competitive procurement it would result in 
a reduction in tariffs. Other reasons highlighted in the qualitative findings were the risk of 
corruption in the award of projects and the risk that smaller developers will be unable to 
compete against larger well-established global developers. This suggests that in a competitive 
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procurement framework for Zimbabwe should be governed by rules that mitigate corruption 
and ensure no barriers to entry for smaller players. However, it is this researcher’s opinion 
that the major reason is that there may be some concerns amongst private sector respondents 
that the introduction of a competitive bidding framework may result in the arbitrary 
cancellation of existing licenses or have other retroactive effects that may negatively impact 
current license holders, especially when a significant amount of capital has already been 
invested towards the development of these projects. This highlights the the need for careful 
transition planning if a competitive bidding framework is introduced.  
 
6.2! Research Questions and Objectives  
 
The study’s findings reveal that there are 38 critical success factors for financing IPPs in 
Zimbabwe that relate to six key aspects of IPP development namely, investment climate, 
power sector characteristics, project economic viability, strength of financial package, people 
factors and government support. The top five most critical success factors according to the 
ranking of respondents are the expected debt paying ability of the project, a transparent, cost 
reflective tariff framework, upholding of contracts, reasonable, fair expected return on equity 
and a bankable feasibility study. The rankings of success factors varied by stakeholder 
grouping, with the private sector rankings significantly different from the rankings assigned 
by the public sector. Several strategies can be employed to improve the implementation of 
IPPs in Zimbabwe in order to increase the number of IPPs that reach financial closure. These 
include improving the the investment climate through the formulation of sound economic 
policies and steps to reduce the country debt overhang, optimising the electricity market 
sector structure by introducing competitive bidding practices and government granting the 
regulator full autonomy in the discharge of its duties, creation of a nodal agency to run the 
entire licensing and permitting process for IPPs, phased project implementation, involving a 
smaller first phase that is leveraged on completion to finance a larger expansion phase and 
the collaborative effort between government and the private sector to formulate mechanisms 
to mitigate country risk. 
 
6.3! Research Conclusion  
!
Reaching financial closure for IPPs in Zimbabwe requires a well thought-out and structured 
plan and the collaboration and input of multiple stakeholders for successful execution.  The 
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overall aim of this study was to identify the contextual factors necessary to catalyse 
investment in PPs. While recognising the limitations of the investigation, this study has 
largely achieved this objective. As demonstrated by this research, in order to catalyse 
investment in IPPs, a suitably enabling environment for investment must be created. That 
enabling environment consists of several factors or elements that may be grouped into six 
categories relating to key aspects of the development of IPPs. These are: investment climate, 
power sector characteristics, project economic viability, strength of financial package, people 
factors and government support. 
 
Many of the factors identified in this study relate to aspects of the development of IPPs that 
are out of the control of the IPP developers, but are within the purview of government to 
control and implement. This underscores the importance of government support in realising 
satisfactory investment in IPPs. The results have also shown that the major challenge IPPs are 
facing with regard to securing financing concerns adequately mitigating country risk to the 
satisfaction of potential financiers. Furthermore, the findings have revealed a disconnect 
between the private sector and public sector’s understanding of what is required and 
important for successfully financing IPPs in the Zimbabwe country context. Given the critical 
role of energy supply and security for the development of the country, more open and 
effective communication between the two sectors is vital if any meaningful improvements in 
investment outcomes are to be realised. As part of this study, several strategies for policy and 
practice have been recommended. These include: 
•! The formulation of a national strategic energy plan oriented towards making 
Zimbabwe a key energy exporter;  
•! The creation of a nodal agency to manage and coordinate all aspects of the 
procurement and development of IPPs in Zimbabwe 
•! Amendment of the Energy Regulatory Act to resolve ambiguity concerning the 
independence of the regulator.  
•! Financial education about energy infrastructure as an asset class for local investors 
through road shows and workshops. 
 
6.4! Recommendations for future research 
 
The research findings have shown that several aspects of the development of IPPs in 
Zimbabwe require further fine tuning and in some instances, total revision. A thorough 
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interrogation of these aspects is warranted and would be most beneficial for the country. 
Future research opportunities exist to:  
 
•! Investigate the experiences of other countries in transitioning from an unsolicited bid 
procurement framework to a competitive one for energy projects. As demonstrated by this 
research, the current framework is not optimal and a competitive tender is the alternative 
preferred by some stakeholders. However, concerns over the retroactive effects on current 
licensees, corruption and the crowding out of small players with the introduction of 
competitive practices, underscores the importance of research into how implementation of 
a new procurement method can be made as seamless and smooth as possible.  
•! Research on existing tariff methodologies and their respective impacts on investment 
outcomes in the countries in which they have been applied, in order identify best practices 
to optimise the tariff framework in Zimbabwe. The use of a combination of REFIT and the 
cost plus methodology in Zimbabwe suggests that neither of the two methods are optimal. 
•! Research on mechanisms and alternative forms of government support other than 
guarantees, that have been used to promote energy infrastructure investment in other 
developing countries with similar risk characteristics to Zimbabwe. This research has 
demonstrated not only the necessity of government support but also the limitations upon 
government in regards to the extent of support they can give IPPs. 
•! Research on mechanisms that can be employed to catalyse investment in energy 
infrastructure projects by local institutional investors. 
•! Research on the impact of regulatory independence on investment and development 
outcomes in the electricity sector world wide and best practices on how regulatory 
independence can be achieved and entrenched. 
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8! APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: ZIMBABWE IPP AND ENERGY SECTOR INFORMATION 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF KEY ENERGY SECTOR LEGISLATION 
 
 
 
Electricity Act of 2002 
 
-! Brought about the restructuring and unbundling of ZESA (a vertically integrated utility) into 
separate successor companies under ZESA Holdings responsible for generation, transmission  
and distribution and service.  
-! Led to the establishment of a regulator for the electricity sector.  
-! Liberalised the energy sector and allowed private participation in generation 
 
 
Energy Regulatory Authority Act of 2011 
 
-! Led to the establishment of ZERA,  
-! Empowers the ZERA board to issue or withdraw licenses to all players in the entire energy 
sector not just the electricity sub sector (includes petroleum and renewable energy sub 
sectors).  
-! Mandates ZERA to regulate the procurement production, transportation, transmission, 
distribution, importation and exportation of energy derived from any energy source. 
-! Creates a legal framework to promote fair competition among both private and public 
players. 
 
 
National Energy Policy of 2012 
 
-! Sets out a framework for measures that will aid in the development of the sector.  
-! Its objectives include  
-! accelerating economic development  
-! facilitating rural development 
-! ensuring environmentally friendly energy development 
-! ensuring efficient utilisation of energy resources. 
-! Speaks further unbundling and privatisation of the utility (which is yet to be implemented) 
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SUMMARY OF LICENSED IPPS – CAPACITY AND ESTIMATED COSTS 
 
 
  LICENSEE TECHNOLOGY CAPACITY EST. COST 
  A. OPERATIONAL    MW  USD 
1 Border Timbers* Biomass ( wood waste) 0,5   
2 Duru Mini Hydro 2,2 2,969,604 
3 Green Fuel Bagasse 18,3   
4 Nyamingura Mini Hydro 1,1 6 ,769 ,053 
5 Pungwe A Mini Hydro 2,75 4,474,576 
6 Hippo Valley Estates Bagasse (co-gen) 33   
7 Triangle Estates Bagasse (co-gen) 45 36 814 167 
8 Pungwe B Power Station Mini Hydro 15,25 26 588 488 
9 Pungwe C Power Station Pvt Ltd                 Mini Hydro 3,72 7 000 000 
  SUB-TOTAL   121,82   
  B. NOT YET OPERATIONAL       
1 Sengwa Power Station Thermal(Coal- fired)  2400 4 400 000 000 
2 Pan African Energy Resources (Pvt) Ltd  Thermal(Coal- fired)  2000 4 000 000 000 
3 Southern Energy Thermal(Coal- fired)  600 1 100 000 000 
4 Great Zimbabwe Hydro Power (Pvt) Ltd Mini Hydro 5 6 700 000 
5 Manako Power (Pvt) Ltd Mini Hydro 2,5 13 000 000 
6 Kupinga Renewable Energy Mini Hydro 1,6 4 434 500 
7 GeoBase Klean Energy Africa Solar PV 250 240 000 000 
11 Yellow Africa Solar PV 50 109 950 000 
12 H.T.Gen Mini Hydro 3,3 6 048 016 
13 Plum Solar Solar PV 5 6 723 000 
11 Immaculate Technologies Mini Hydro 1,7 2 962 000 
12 Shilands Enterprises gas fired 345 405 604 134 
13 De Green Rhino Energy Solar PV 50 100 000 000 
14 Lueven Investments Solar PV 10 20 000 000 
15 Hauna Power Station Private Limited Mini Hydro 2,3 7 301 835 
16 Sinogy Power Solar PV 175 489 760 000 
17 Centragrid Private Limited Solar PV 25 50 334 049 
18 Utopia Power Company Private Limited Solar PV 15 25 100 000 
19 SolGas (Private) Limited Solar PV 5 8 423 750 
20 Richaw Solar Tech Private Limited Solar PV 5 10 018 000 
  SUB TOTAL  6551,40   
  GRAND TOTAL   6673,22    
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IPP PROJECT DEVELOPMENT COSTS 
 
 
Type of Fee Incidence Fee  Sliding Scale Fee Source 
Generation License 
Application Fee 
Upfront   (ZERA, 
2016a) 
Greenfield Generation 
License  
   (ZERA, 
2016a) 
1 -10 MW Every 5 years*   $10 000    
11MW and above Every 5 years*   $20 000  plus 10 000 per 25 MW***   
Brownfield  Generation 
License 
   (ZERA, 
2016a) 
1 -10 MW Every 5 years *  $5 000  plus  5 000 per 25 MW***  
11MW and above Every 5 years*  $10 000    
Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) 
Upfront 0.8% -1.0%  of the project cost (EMA, 
2016) 
Land Lease Fee Annual **  $20 000    
Non-consumptive Water 
Use Permit  
For projects on:  
 
ZINWA infrastructure 
 
Run-off river 
 
 
Self built infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual 
 
Annual 
 
 
Annual 
 
 
 
 
10% 
 
$1.00/Kw 
 
 
$0.50/Kw 
 
 
 
 
of project revenues 
 
plus, a variable charge of 
$0.001/Kw 
 
plus, a variable charge of 
$0.001/Kw 
 
(ZERA, 
2016a) 
     
 
* till expiry of license, ** for duration of lease, *** or part thereof 
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APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM AND INTERVIEW FRAMEWORK  
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher:  Timisela Zunguze 
 
Research Title:  Defying The Odds – Understanding the Critical Success Factors for 
Financing Independent Power Producers in Zimbabwe 
 
 
Project Overview and Purpose: 
 
This research study is being undertaken for a thesis that forms part of the requirements to 
complete a Master of Commerce in Development Finance at the Graduate School of Business, 
University of Cape Town under the supervision of Professor Anton Eberhard. 
 
The purpose of the study is to investigate, identify and understand the critical success factors for 
financing independent power producers (IPPs) in Zimbabwe by examining the IPPs in the country that 
have been successfully implemented and in depth interviews with various stakeholders and 
practitioners. Specifically, the research seeks to explore the perceptions amongst practitioners and 
stakeholders, to ascertain their outlook of the IPP industry as a whole, their opinions of what the 
critical success factors are and insights and recommendations as to how implementation can be fine 
tuned to accelerate investment and completion of projects.  
 
Due to the exploratory nature of the research a qualitative approach has been adopted, using 
interviews to learn more about the experiences, practices, assessments and aspirations of all the 
stakeholders and practitioners in the development of IPPs in Zimbabwe. The research will aid in 
expanding the knowledge about the successful implementation of IPPs in Zimbabwe and add to the 
body of literature focused on energy infrastructure development in Africa. 
 
There are no known risks or dangers to you associated with this study. Unless you provide an 
explicit approval, the researcher will not attempt to identify you with responses given during 
the interview, or to name you as a participant in the study, nor will she facilitate anyone else 
doing so. 
 
 
I acknowledge that I am participating in this study of my own free will. I understand that I 
may refuse to participate or stop participating at any time without penalty. If I wish, I will be 
given a copy of this consent form. 
 
 
 
Signature:  ___________________________ Date:   _____________________ 
 
 
Please Print Name:    __________________________________________________ 
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INTERVIEW FRAMEWORK 
 
Defying The Odds: Understanding the Critical Success Factors for Financing Independent 
Power Producers in Zimbabwe 
 
1)! General Questions 
 
All participants will be asked this set of questions regardless of stakeholder grouping. 
 
A: General Information on Interviewee and Organisation 
 
1.! What type of organisation do you work for? 
a.! Pension Fund 
b.! Private Equity 
c.! Asset Management 
d.! Commercial Bank 
e.! Public Utility 
f.! Independent Regulator 
g.! Development Finance Institution 
h.! IPP/Development Company 
i.! Legal Advisory/Law Firm 
j.! Financial Advisory 
k.! Other (specify) 
 
2.! What is your position/role and job function in the organisation? 
 
3.! How long have you worked for the organisation? 
 
4.! What is your educational background? 
a.! Accounting/Finance/Economics 
b.! Business Administration/Business Management 
c.! Natural Science/Engineering 
d.! Politics/Development Studies 
e.! Arts/History/Law 
f.! Other (please specify) 
 
5.! Briefly describe your experience with IPPs and energy infrastructure projects. 
 
 
B: General Questions on IPP Financing and Development in Zimbabwe 
 
Country Level Perspective  
 
6.! What is your view on the level of private participation in generation in Zimbabwe? Prompt: 
How do you think it compares to other countries in the region? 
7.! Has the introduction of a multi-currency regime/dollarization in 2009 aided or hindered the 
development and financing of IPPs? 
8.! What has been the impact of the Indigenisation laws on IPP development and financing in 
Zimbabwe? 
9.! What is your view on the current IPP licensing and tariff framework in Zimbabwe? 
Prompt: What are its strengths or shortcomings? 
10.!Do you think a competitive bidding framework for IPPs in Zimbabwe should be introduced? 
11.!Do you think there is adequate support for IPPs by government? 
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12.!What institutional or regulatory changes, if any, would you suggest to increase investment 
and the participation of private players in generation? 
 
Project Level Perspective  
 
13.!What stage of the project development process do you think is most critical for the success of 
an IPP – procurement, construction or operation. 
14.!How important do you think the scale/ size of a project (planned installed capacity) is for the 
success of an IPP?  
15.!What are the top three risks at the project level for an IPP developer in Zimbabwe?  
 
 
The following schedules contain questions that will be asked to each stakeholder grouping separately.  
 
2)! Interview Schedule for IPPs 
 
Project Details 
 
1.! How many of your power projects have reached financial closure, are in construction, have 
been commissioned or are in operation? 
2.! What type of projects are they? Prompt: Hydro, solar or other 
3.! What is the installed capacity/ size of each project? 
4.! What is the total project cost for each project? 
5.! Did you have to construct transmission infrastructure for evacuation of power and connecting 
to the grid as part of the project? What percentage of the total project cost was the associated 
transmission infrastructure? 
6.! What is the procurement arrangement for each project? Prompt: Build, Own Operate (BOO) 
or Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT)?  
7.! What was the duration of 1) planning 2) construction 3) operation? 
Prompt: (planning includes feasibility, design and negotiation) 
8.! What was the project finance structure in terms of what percentage of the total investment is 
equity? 
9.! Did you employ any advisors to assist you with project implementation? 
10.!Did you acquire any government guarantees for the project(s)? 
11.!Did you negotiate the generation tariff directly with ZETDC? 
12.!What security arrangements did you make with ZETDC for the project(s)? 
13.!How would you describe the negotiation process with government? Who was in the stronger 
position when bargaining for the PPA contract terms.  
14.!What has been your experience with the off-taker in terms of payment for electricity 
generated? Have you had any payment disputes to date? 
 
General Questions 
 
15.! Is experience important in successfully developing an IPP? Did you have any prior 
experience in energy infrastructure projects before developing your own?  
16.!What influenced your decision on what project size to implement? 
17.!How would you rate the licensing and permitting process for an IPP in Zimbabwe -Easy, 
moderate, difficult or very difficult? What kind of costs are involved? 
18.!How accessible is debt financing, both local and global, for projects in Zimbabwe? 
19.!What is the most difficult stage of project implementation – planning, construction or 
operations? 
20.!Did you experience any significant delays in project implementation? What caused those 
delays? 
21.!What difficulties if any did you experience in arranging the finance and security arrangements 
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for the project(s)? 
22.!  Do you have any other remarks you would like to make? 
 
3)! Interview Schedule for Advisors 
 
1.! What in your opinion are the major reasons why some licensed project developers fail to 
reach financial closure?  
2.! Are typical project development costs for IPPs prohibitively high? 
3.! What project characteristics do investors consider in assessing the financial feasibility of a 
project in Zimbabwe?  
4.! Does the domestic market have any capacity to participate in financing IPPs?  What, if any, 
are those local financing sources? 
5.! What external financing sources are accessible to projects in Zimbabwe? What are the main 
barriers to accessing external financing for projects in Zimbabwe? 
6.! What is the level of involvement of DFIs in the development of IPPs and other energy 
projects in Zimbabwe? 
7.! What is the most common form /feasible financing structure for IPP projects in Zimbabwe? 
Prompt: project finance or corporate finance? 
8.! What are the typical financial and legal conditions precedent required by debt financiers or 
investors in Zimbabwe? 
9.! Is international arbitration possible for IPPs in Zimbabwe? 
10.!What are the key risks that financiers or investors need to be covered for in order to invest in 
Zimbabwe? 
11.! In your experience, what kind of government support/guarantees are available to cover these 
risks for IPPs in Zimbabwe? 
12.!The transmission utility is the sole off-taker for IPPs in Zimbabwe and the PPA is central to 
securing the revenue. Is this a hindrance to securing financing for IPPs? If so, how might this 
risk be mitigated in the Zimbabwean context? 
13.!What security arrangements are available to IPP developers in Zimbabwe? What are the 
conditions for successfully arranging this? 
14.!What credit enhancements or investment incentives are available in Zimbabwe for investment 
in private generation? 
15.!What market trends do you foresee for IPP space in Zimbabwe over the next 5 to 10 years? 
16.!What do you think are the top three enablers that must be established in order to increase 
investment in private generation in Zimbabwe? Prompt: conducive laws, regulations, fiscal 
measures, steps towards acquiring a credit rating etc.? 
17.!Do you have any other remarks you would like to make? 
 
 
4)! Interview Schedule for Investors 
 
1.! What is your organisation’s investment mandate? Does your organisation have an appetite for 
energy projects in Zimbabwe? 
2.! How many energy projects in Zimbabwe, if any, have your organisation invested in? How 
many of those were IPPs? 
3.! What is the typical investment size your organisation makes? 
4.! Do you use equity instruments, debt instruments or both? If equity, what is the minimum 
equity stake you look for? 
5.! What project characteristics do you consider in assessing the bankability of a project in 
Zimbabwe 
6.! What is the hurdle rate your organisation targets for investments? 
7.! Briefly describe the key components of your organisation’s investment appraisal process 
8.! Briefly describe your organisation’s investment approval procedures.  
9.! What are your key concerns when considering an investment in the energy sector in 
Zimbabwe? 
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10.!What in your opinion are the major risks associated with investing in Zimbabwe? 
11.!What measures in your opinion would reduce the risk of financing projects in Zimbabwe? 
12.!What security arrangements do you expect, at the very minimum, when investing in 
Zimbabwe? 
13.!Do you have any other remarks you would like to make? 
 
 
5)! Interview Schedule for the National Energy Regulator 
 
1.! What is the total number of IPPs that have been licensed? What is the split by type of energy? 
Prompt: How many hydro, solar, gas etc. 
2.! Briefly outline the licensing adjudication process? How do you score/rate license applicants? 
3.! What are the typical generation license conditions?  
4.! Are you satisfied with the standard of feasibility studies submitted by generation license 
applicants in general? 
5.! So few prospective IPPs in Zimbabwe have reached financial closure. At what point in 
project implementation do most developers get stuck in the mud? 
6.! What is (are) the major challenges faced by IPPs in project implementation in Zimbabwe? 
7.! What kind of assistance, if any, do IPP developers request from the Regulator with regard to 
project implementation? 
8.!  What are your thoughts on the current IPP procurement policy (unsolicited applications) 
versus competitive bidding? 
9.! Is there a national energy sector plan for Zimbabwe? 
10.!Do you have any other remarks you would like to make? 
 
 
6)! Interview Schedule for the Off-taker 
 
 
1.! How many IPPs are actively supplying the grid? 
2.! What is the total amount of power supplied to the grid by IPPs? 
3.! What has been the operational performance of those IPPs in terms of availability? 
4.! What is the average duration of the PPAs you have signed with IPPs to date? 
5.! What are the security arrangements IPPs have requested for security of revenue? 
6.! What changes if any would you make to to the current regulatory framework for IPPs?  
7.! In your PPA negotiation with the IPPs, who has the most bargaining power. Does this power 
change or shift once the IPP starts supplying the grid? 
8.! Do you have any other remarks you would like to make? 
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APPENDIX C: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Defying the Odds – Understanding the Critical Success Factors for Financing Independent Power 
Producers in Zimbabwe 
 
Part 1: General Information on Respondent 
 
1.! What type of organisation you work for: 
 
 
 
2.! What is your position in the organisation? ___________________________________________ 
 
3.! How many years of industrial experience do you have? _____________ years 
 
4.! Which of the following energy projects have you/your organisation been involved in? 
 
⃝ Solar ⃝ Bagasse 
⃝ Hydro ⃝ Wind 
⃝ Coal ⃝ Diesel 
 
Part 2: Perception of IPPs and Energy Sector 
 
Please rate the degree to which you agree/disagree with the following statements about IPPs and the energy 
industry in Zimbabwe. You may give support or further clarification of your response(s) in the comments box 
provided below. 
 
 
# General Statements  Not Applicable Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 The laws and policy framework for 
private participation in generation are 
well crafted and sound 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
2 Policy on licensing and required permits 
for IPP’s is accurately and consistently 
applied. 
 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
3 The unsolicited bid procurement 
framework is the most optimal for 
Zimbabwe 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
4 The regulator is competent, efficient and 
well capacitated 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
5 The current tariff methodology results in a 
tariff that is cost reflective 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
⃝ Pension Fund ⃝ Advisory Firm ⃝ Asset Management ⃝ Government Department 
⃝ DFI ⃝ IPP ⃝ Commercial Bank ⃝ International investor 
⃝ Insurance Company ⃝ Regulator ⃝ Utility ⃝ Other: Specify 
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6 Project development costs are 
unreasonably high  
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
7 There is a clear  separation between the 
regulator and the line ministry  
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
8 There is need to further unbundle  the 
offtaker  
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
9 There is adequate government support for 
IPPs 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
10 There is investor appetite for IPP projects 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
Part 3: Success Factors for Financing IPPs  
 
Please evaluate the degree of relevance or importance of each of the listed factors on the successful financing 
of IPPs in Zimbabwe, using a scale of 1-5, where 1 is “Not critical for financing IPPs” and 5 is “Most critical 
for for financing IPPs”. 
 
Should you wish to elaborate further on your assigned rating for any particular factor, please add your 
comments in the box provided. 
 
# Success Factor 1  
 Not 
critical 
2  
 Less 
critical 
3  
Critical 
4  
More 
critical 
5  
Most 
critical 
S1 Bankable feasibility study 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S2 Competitive bidding framework 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S3 Stable macro economic policies 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S4 Experience and competency of the developer 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S5 Expected debt paying ability of project 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S6 Reasonable, fair expected return on equity (ROE) ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S7 Clear policy on land for energy projects (tenure and 
fair price) 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S8 Policy Guarantee Agreement 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S9 Technical and financial assistance from DFIs for 
project preparation 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S10 Competent, consistent and fair regulator 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S11 Standardised PPA 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S12 Project Size (planned initial installed capacity and 
transmission infrastructure requirements) 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S13 Comprehensive national energy strategic plan 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S14 A transparent, cost reflective tariff framework  ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S15 Financial education about energy infrastructure as an 
asset class for domestic investors 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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S16 Government support in the form of sovereign 
guarantees 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S17 Reduction of country debt overhang 
  
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S18 Credit enhancements –escrow accounts, ring fencing 
of off-taker receivables 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S19 Project exemptions from tax and duties 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S20 Credit rating for Zimbabwe and local companies ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S21 Further unbundling of the offtaker ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S22 Quality of local equity partners 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S23 Good stakeholder relationship management by 
project sponsors 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S24 Clear policy on decommissioning of PPAs 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S25 Origin of investors (local versus external financiers) ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S26 Skilled and experienced advisors (financial, legal, 
technical) 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S27 Solid risk allocation, management and mitigation 
plan 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S28 Experience of financiers with developing country 
risk 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S29 Coordination between  government departments 
responsible for issuing project permits and consents 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S30 Reasonable licensing and statutory fees 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S31 Operationally efficient and solvent off taker  ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S32 Well functioning domestic financial markets and 
banking system 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S33 Upholding of contracts 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S34 Ability to export power regionally 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S35 A Program Champion for IPPS 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S36 Ability of IPPs to lobby government 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S37 Cost of financing (WACC) 
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S38 Quality of technical partner and high technical 
performance of equipment/technology chosen 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S39 Financial innovation and creativity in structuring 
financing arrangements 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S40 Open and effective communication between the 
private and public sector 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
If there are any other factors you feel are important but not listed above, please add them in the area provided 
below. 
 
S41  
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S42  
 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
S43  ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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Part 4: Major Risks for IPP Investments 
 
Please rank the following risks according to the degree of threat for IPP investments in Zimbabwe. The 
definition of each risk is given in italics below the named risk. 
 
 One (1) represents the highest/greatest threat and seven (7) represents the lowest/least threat. Use each 
number once.  
 
 
# Risk Factor Rank 
1 Climate Risk 
The risk of loss due to an adverse change in the prevailing weather 
conditions 
 
 
2 Payment Risk 
The risk that the project will not generate expected or sufficient revenues to 
service debt and pay operational expenses due to the credit quality and the 
payment capacity 
of the off-taker. 
 
 
3 Developer Risk 
The risk that the developer/development team lacks the technical and 
financial capacity to effectively execute the project 
 
 
4 Country Risk 
The risk to investment arising from changes in the political and economic 
environment 
 
 
5 Technology Risk   
The risk to investment caused by  defects, faults or incompleteness in the 
technology used. 
 
 
6 Currency and Transfer 
Risk of loss resulting from changes in the currency/exchange rate regime 
and the inability to freely move investment earnings out of the country 
 
 
7 Repayment Risk 
The risk of non- payment of debt service to lenders by the project company  
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APPENDIX D: QUALITATIVE PHASE - RESPONDENT PROFILES AND FINDINGS 
 
EXPERT INTERVIEWS RESPONDENT PROFILES 
 
Interviewees Stakeholder 
Grouping 
Organisation 
Type 
Position Years of 
industry 
experience 
Date Approx. 
duration 
(mins) 
Respondent 1 Domestic Investor  Pension Fund Head of Select Equity Investments 7 22-09-16 50 
Respondent 2 Domestic Investor Pension Fund Head of Interest Bearing Investments 15 26-09-16 47 
Respondent 3 Offtaker Utility Director 18 30-09-16 35 
Respondent 4 Foreign Investor Investor and EPC Contractor Head of Marketing Investments  10 30-09-16 46 
Respondent 5 Advisor Development Finance Institution Principal Financial Analyst 3 04-10-16 42 
Respondent 6 Offtaker Utility Electricity Trading Manager 22 07-10-16 37 
Respondent 7 IPP Developer IPP Development Company Chief Design Engineer & Operations Manager 36 07-10-16 30 
Respondent 8 IPP Developer IPP Development Company Managing Director 18 18-10-16 30 
Respondent 9 Advisor Financial Advisory Firm Director 18 18-10-16 40 
Respondent 10 IPP Developer IPP Development Company Managing Director 7 24-10-16 35 
Respondent 11 Government Department Energy Director 19 26-10-16 30 
Respondent 12 Regulator Energy Regulatory Authority Economic Analyst 20 27-10-16 45 
Respondent 13 IPP Developer IPP Development Company Managing Director 18 27-10-16 30 
Respondent 14 IPP Developer IPP Development Company Director 4 27-10-16 48 
Respondent 15 Government Department Finance Technical Advisor  17 01-11-16 50 
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SUMMARY OF FACTORS IMPEDING INVESTMENT 
 
 
 
Country Level 
 
Unfavourable investment climate 
Liquidity challenges, low industry capacity utilization, weak domestic demand and 
no certainty of security of property rights and upholding of contracts 
 
 Country’s negative repayment record 
Country debt overhang, negative country perception by international lenders 
 
 Policy inconsistency 
Inconsistency and inaccuracy in the application and implementation of existing 
policies creates uncertainty 
 
 Lack of clear policy on how to counter balance country risk 
Lack of political will to provide support for IPPs in arranging security for 
financing e.g. sovereign guarantees 
 
 No clear policy on land  
Tenure of leases for energy projects shorter than life of projects 
 
 Unfavourable electricity market structure 
Government protectionism of non performing entities, politically controlled final 
retail tariff and natural monopoly power of offtaker uncompetitive 
 
 Negative public perception of private players  
Private players viewed with suspicion and seen as competitors not partners in 
development 
 
 Regulatory inefficiency 
Under resourced regulator, political interference, circularity in licensing 
procedures, lengthy turnaround times, inconsistent application of policy and 
prioritisation of government projects over IPPs 
 
 Inefficient tariff framework  
No clear methodology is being applied (cost plus or REFIT or both), cost plus 
methodology encourages inefficient cost structures for IPPs, political interference 
in tariff determination and non-cost reflective tariffs 
 
 Lack of coherent energy sector planning  
Absence of a national energy plan that specifies targets for each type of resource 
and timelines for attainment of targets 
 
 Weaknesses of unsolicited bids procurement practice 
Speculators, unsuitably qualified developers awarded licenses, possible 
misalignment of land resources (arable land used for projects) and bed blocking  
 
 
Project Level 
 
Shallow domestic capital markets 
Liquidity challenges, severely constrained deposit taking financial institutions, lack 
of domestic investor capability and understanding of long term infrastructure 
investments, dependence on foreign borrowings which given country risk are much 
harder to secure and  
lack of financial engineering skills 
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Project Level 
 
Insincere international investors  
Few genuine investors, high incidence of investors just looking for a bargain  
 
 High cost of financing  
High country risk premium, new market, burdensome escrow arrangements 
(funding requirements and cost of housing escrows in banks outside the country) 
 
 Limited credit enhancements 
No sovereign or commercial guarantees available 
 
 Lengthy financing negotiations 
Stringent financing conditions and difficult to secure debt 
 
 Poor project preparation 
None existent or poorly done feasibility studies and inability of developers to 
package project in a way that attracts investors 
 
 Lack of creativity and financial innovation 
In arranging financing and security for IPPs 
 Lack of initiative to lobby government 
IPPs not organised and hesitant to actively engage government 
  
Unskilled, inexperienced and under resourced developers 
Developers have no experience in developing projects and little or no financial 
capability to fund development costs or counterpart funding if required 
 
 High project development costs  
High cost of advisory, feasibility studies, licensing fees and other statutory fees 
 
 Challenges with the offtaker 
Poor creditworthiness, lengthy and bureaucratic PPA negotiations, operational 
inefficiencies, very long response times to address problems, limited scope for 
ring-fencing of receivables – availability of blue chip customers to ring fence is 
limited 
 
 Inadequate government support 
Difficulty in acquiring national project status, incomplete support in providing 
guarantees required by investors, lack of coordination between government 
departments in issuing of supporting statutory requirements like EIA and land 
lease, long turn around times for issuance of permits and consents  
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STRATEGIES RECOMMENDED BY RESPONDENTS TO INCREASE INVESTMENT IN IPPS 
 
 
Strategy Description 
 
Issue solved or mitigated 
 
Competitive bidding  
Procurement 
 
Identified as a success factor 
 
Must be based on based on international best practice. Suggestions for implementation included: 
 
1. Pure competitive bidding practices where The Ministry of Energy should identify potential sites for 
the various IPP technologies and the development of these sites as IPPs are put to tender. Joint venture 
partnerships with local companies as a pre-qualification requirement to bid in order to protect smaller 
local players from being pushed out by bigger global players. 
Standardised project documentation – key contracts and other support agreements 
 
2. Hybrid procurement method 
A combination of unsolicited bids for smaller projects and competitive bidding for larger projects to 
maximise cost efficiency and simplify execution, standardised documentation and support agreements 
 
 
Speculators 
Bed blocking 
Poor project preparation 
 
Credit risk insurance from  
external credit insurers 
 
Government does not give commercial guarantees but financiers often require commercial guarantees 
against offtaker risk. To get around this, IPPs can approach credit risk insurers such as Euler Hermes. 
However, there is a trade off because insurance will increase the total project cost.  
 
 
No government support in the 
form of commercial guarantees 
Investment incentives  
 
Identified as a success factor 
 
The provision of investment incentive for investments made in critical sectors like energy for local 
institutional investors, where government permits a certain percentage of the total amount invested in 
an energy project to be invested offshore. This effectively creates a hedge against country risk for 
some portion of the investment which encourages investment. 
 
Currency risk 
Country risk 
Low rate of investment 
 
Stricter adjudication of  
feasibility studies at licensing 
stage 
 
The licensing framework should explicitly state the minimum acceptable standards for feasibility 
studies to be submitted by potential licensees and these standards should be enforced by the regulator 
in adjudicating license applications. 
 
 
 
Speculators 
Poor project preparation  
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Strategy Description 
 
Issue solved or mitigated 
 
Scalable projects that start 
small 
 
Identified as a success factor 
 
Phased project implementation. Smaller projects are easier to execute than larger projects in this 
current environment. Once operational, developers can leverage the experience gained in executing the 
smaller project to scale up capacity. The risk is significantly reduced which should make financing the 
expansion phase easier  
 
 
High cost of financing 
Execution risk  
Financing risk 
 
Policy guarantees 
 
Identified as a success factor  
 
Commitment from government on key policy issues affecting the implementation of IPPs such as no 
expropriation, land lease tenure, the right to export power, currency conversion and repatriation of 
profits. 
 
 
Policy inconsistency and 
uncertainty 
 
Letter of no intention for 
land allocated for energy 
projects 
 
Security of tenure on land allocated for energy projects is critical and in Zimbabwe land is a very 
topical issue. In addition to a policy guarantees, government should issue a letter of no intention for the 
life of the project for land allocated for energy projects. 
 
 
Policy uncertainty 
 
Sovereign guarantees 
 
Identified as a success factor 
 
Commitment from government regarding the survival and recognition of key project contracts such as 
the PPA, fuel supply agreements and land lease agreements should there be a change in government. 
 
 
Country Risk 
Political Risk 
 
Financial assistance from 
DFIs  
 
Identified as a success factor 
 
 
Poor project preparation is largely the result of the developer lacking the financial resources to 
undertake the necessary project development to bring the project to a bankable state. DFIs are well 
placed to assist in funding some development costs such as the cost of undertaking feasibility studies. 
 
 
Poor project preparation 
 
Export oriented national 
energy plan 
 
Identified as a success factor 
 
A national energy plan or a national energy framework that says one of the goals for the country is for 
Zimbabwe to be a net exporter by a specific year would greatly focus policy initiatives and attract 
investment. It should also make explicit targets for the mix of fuel technologies. It also removes 
uncertainty about where IPPs fit in the overall plan for the sector by government. 
 
 
Policy uncertainty 
Low rate of investment in IPPs 
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A nodal agency to run the 
entire licensing and 
permitting process for IPPs 
 
An institution that is a “one stop shop” which handles all the licensing, permitting and issuing of 
standardised government support agreements for IPPs. 
 
Regulatory inefficiencies  
Lack of coordination between 
government departments  
 
 
Financial education for 
domestic financial market 
 
Identified as a success factor 
 
Raising awareness of infrastructure as an asset class and fostering an understanding of the modalities 
of long term energy infrastructure investments and its associated risks through conferences and 
workshops. 
 
Shallow local capital markets 
Lack of understanding about  
energy infrastructure 
investments 
 
 
Currency insurance 
 
The creation of a form of insurance from regional banks or institutions, where IPPs pay premiums so 
that dollars will be made available when required should the monetary policy situation in the country 
change adversely. 
 
 
Currency risk 
 
Amending the Energy 
Regulatory Act to give ZERA 
full autonomy 
 
Identified as a success factor 
 
 
The crafting of the law needs to be made more airtight. Currently it is contradictory and leaves room 
for political interference 
 
 
Political interference in the 
determination of the tariff 
 
Policy on decommissioning of 
PPA 
 
Identified as a success factor 
 
 
A legal framework that governs how decommissioning of PPAs and renegotiating them for the 
remainder of the life of the plant is handled. 
 
 
 
 
 
Offtaker risk 
 
 
Seller’s Credit to finance 
projects  
 
Contractor gets Seller’s Credit –a percentage of the total cost -  loan agreement between contractor and 
banks - then another between contractor and project owner 
 
 
 
Underinvestment in IPPs 
Financing Risk 
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Unbundling the offtaker 
Identified as a success factor 
 
 
 
Separating distribution and retail function. More offtakers to encourage competition and efficiency 
 
Offtaker risk 
 
Alternative forms of 
Government Support 
 
-! Providing enhancements that encourage investment e.g. subsidies, guarantees 
-! Providing land at no cost to developers to be repaid for downstream 
-! Special economic zones 
 
 
Inadequate government 
support 
 
Local capacity building 
efforts in various fuel 
technologies spearheaded by 
Government  
 
 
Capacity building concerning the various technologies, Zimbabwe wants to implement with regard to 
power generation. Not just for the benefit of prospective local developers but also government itself. 
Either through specialised training or courses/degrees offered at local institutions 
 
 
Technology Risk 
Execution Risk 
 
Creation of an IPP Regional 
Power Trading Mechanism 
 
In order to guarantee hard currency that is required to repay investors a viable avenue could be through 
exporting power to the region through organisations like SAPP. Currently this avenue is only available 
to the generation utility only but not to IPPs. IPPs need to partner with the utility to be able to export 
their power because most are not dispatchable (export requires consistent supply) and too small to be 
able to negotiate such agreements on their own.  
 
Currency risk 
Offtaker risk 
 
Optimisation of tariff 
framework 
Several tariff models should be explored and interrogated to determine the best one, which could 
actually be a hybrid of existing models e.g. a long run marginal cost model. ZERA needs to do more 
work there. 
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APPENDIX E: QUANTITATIVE PHASE - FINDINGS 
 
SURVEY DATA DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
 N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
 Stat Stat SE Stat Stat Stat SE Stat SE 
S1 36 4,08 0,16 0,97 0,94 -0,37 0,39 -1,44 0,77 
S2 36 3,31 0,20 1,21 1,48 0,18 0,39 -1,21 0,77 
S3 36 4,00 0,16 0,96 0,91 -0,42 0,39 -1,00 0,77 
S4 36 4,06 0,14 0,86 0,74 -0,40 0,39 -0,83 0,77 
S5 36 4,44 0,12 0,69 0,48 -0,87 0,39 -0,39 0,77 
S6 36 4,22 0,11 0,68 0,46 -0,31 0,39 -0,76 0,77 
S7 36 3,94 0,18 1,09 1,20 -0,44 0,39 -1,26 0,77 
S8 36 3,72 0,16 0,97 0,95 -0,18 0,39 -0,93 0,77 
S9 36 3,64 0,18 1,07 1,15 -0,24 0,39 -1,15 0,77 
S10 36 4,06 0,16 0,98 0,97 -0,88 0,39 0,76 0,77 
S11 36 3,53 0,18 1,06 1,11 -0,62 0,39 0,22 0,77 
S12 36 3,39 0,19 1,15 1,33 -0,13 0,39 -1,07 0,77 
S13 36 3,89 0,17 1,04 1,07 -0,42 0,39 -1,03 0,77 
S14 36 4,39 0,12 0,73 0,53 -0,77 0,39 -0,68 0,77 
S15 36 3,50 0,18 1,08 1,17 -0,14 0,39 -0,65 0,77 
S16 36 3,33 0,22 1,33 1,77 -0,27 0,39 -1,02 0,77 
S17 36 3,36 0,20 1,22 1,49 -0,25 0,39 -0,70 0,77 
S18 36 3,75 0,14 0,84 0,71 -0,10 0,39 -0,58 0,77 
S19 36 3,08 0,17 1,00 0,99 -0,17 0,39 -0,40 0,77 
S20 36 3,25 0,16 0,94 0,88 -0,10 0,39 -0,11 0,77 
S21 36 2,86 0,20 1,17 1,38 0,40 0,39 -0,80 0,77 
S22 36 3,53 0,19 1,13 1,28 -0,45 0,39 -0,35 0,77 
S23 36 3,64 0,16 0,96 0,92 -0,42 0,39 0,28 0,77 
S24 36 3,31 0,18 1,06 1,13 -0,06 0,39 -0,75 0,77 
S25 36 2,53 0,20 1,21 1,46 0,50 0,39 -0,46 0,77 
S26 36 3,67 0,14 0,86 0,74 0,16 0,39 -0,78 0,77 
S27 36 3,81 0,15 0,89 0,79 -0,11 0,39 -0,85 0,77 
S28 36 3,69 0,16 0,98 0,96 -0,29 0,39 0,05 0,77 
S29 36 4,03 0,14 0,84 0,71 -0,05 0,39 -1,61 0,77 
S30 36 3,75 0,16 0,94 0,88 -0,12 0,39 -0,90 0,77 
S31 36 4,03 0,14 0,84 0,71 -0,36 0,39 -0,77 0,77 
S32 36 3,92 0,14 0,84 0,71 -0,14 0,39 -0,90 0,77 
S33 36 4,36 0,14 0,83 0,69 -1,10 0,39 0,36 0,77 
S34 36 3,47 0,20 1,21 1,46 -0,50 0,39 -0,46 0,77 
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S35 36 3,00 0,17 1,04 1,09 0,48 0,39 -0,46 0,77 
S36 36 3,17 0,19 1,16 1,34 0,12 0,39 -0,79 0,77 
S37 36 4,00 0,15 0,89 0,80 -0,51 0,39 -0,52 0,77 
S38 36 3,83 0,14 0,81 0,66 -0,02 0,39 -0,77 0,77 
S39 36 3,83 0,15 0,88 0,77 -0,19 0,39 -0,73 0,77 
S40 36 3,61 0,17 0,99 0,99 -0,05 0,39 -1,00 0,77 
Valid 
N 
(list 
wise) 
36                 
 
 
 
SHAPIRO WILK TEST 
 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Factor Statistic df Sig. Factor Statistic df Sig. 
S1 0,77 36,00 0,00 S21 0,89 36,00 0,00 
S2 0,87 36,00 0,00 S22 0,90 36,00 0,00 
S3 0,83 36,00 0,00 S23 0,88 36,00 0,00 
S4 0,84 36,00 0,00 S24 0,91 36,00 0,01 
S5 0,73 36,00 0,00 S25 0,90 36,00 0,00 
S6 0,79 36,00 0,00 S26 0,86 36,00 0,00 
S7 0,81 36,00 0,00 S27 0,87 36,00 0,00 
S8 0,88 36,00 0,00 S28 0,86 36,00 0,00 
S9 0,87 36,00 0,00 S29 0,79 36,00 0,00 
S10 0,81 36,00 0,00 S30 0,87 36,00 0,00 
S11 0,89 36,00 0,00 S31 0,84 36,00 0,00 
S12 0,90 36,00 0,00 S32 0,85 36,00 0,00 
S13 0,85 36,00 0,00 S33 0,75 36,00 0,00 
S14 0,75 36,00 0,00 S34 0,90 36,00 0,00 
S15 0,90 36,00 0,00 S35 0,88 36,00 0,00 
S16 0,90 36,00 0,00 S36 0,91 36,00 0,01 
S17 0,90 36,00 0,00 S37 0,85 36,00 0,00 
S18 0,87 36,00 0,00 S38 0,85 36,00 0,00 
S19 0,91 36,00 0,01 S39 0,87 36,00 0,00 
S20 0,90 36,00 0,00 S40 0,88 36,00 0,00 
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OVERALL RANKING OF SUCCESS FACTORS  
 
 
  Number of Responses    
Code Critical success factor 1 2 3 4 5 Mean RII Rank 
S5 Expected debt paying ability of project 0 0 4 12 20 4,44 0,889 1 
S14 Transparent, cost reflective tariff framework  0 0 5 12 19 4,39 0,878 2 
S33 Upholding of contracts 0 1 5 10 20 4,36 0,872 3 
S6 Reasonable, fair expected return on equity  0 0 5 18 13 4,22 0,844 4 
S1 Bankable feasibility study 0 1 12 6 17 4,08 0,817 5 
S4 Experience and competency of the developer 0 1 9 13 13 4,06 0,811 6 
S10 Competent, consistent and fair regulator 1 0 10 10 15 4,06 0,811 6 
S29 Coordination between government departments  0 0 12 11 13 4,03 0,806 8 
S31 Operationally efficient and solvent offtaker 0 1 9 14 12 4,03 0,806 8 
S3 Stable macro economic policies 0 2 10 10 14 4,00 0,800 10 
S37 Cost of financing (WACC) 0 2 8 14 12 4,00 0,800 10 
S7 Clear policy on land for energy projects  0 4 10 6 16 3,94 0,789 12 
S32 Well functioning domestic financial markets and banking system 0 1 11 14 10 3,92 0,783 13 
S13 Comprehensive national energy strategic plan 0 4 9 10 13 3,89 0,778 14 
S38 Quality of technical partner and high technical performance  0 1 12 15 8 3,83 0,767 15 
S39 Financial innovation and creativity in structuring financing arrangements 0 2 11 14 9 3,83 0,767 15 
S27 Solid risk allocation, management and mitigation plan 0 2 12 13 9 3,81 0,761 17 
S18 Credit enhancements (escrow accounts, ring fencing receivables) 0 2 12 15 7 3,75 0,750 18 
S30 Reasonable licensing and statutory fees 0 3 12 12 9 3,75 0,750 18 
S8 Policy Guarantee Agreement 0 4 11 12 9 3,72 0,744 20 
S28 Experience of financiers with developing country risk 1 1 15 10 9 3,69 0,739 21 
S26 Skilled and experienced advisors  0 2 15 12 7 3,67 0,733 22 
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Code Critical success factor 1 2 3 4 5 Mean RII Rank 
S9 Technical and financial assistance from DFIs  0 7 8 12 9 3,64 0,728 23 
S23 Good stakeholder relationship management by project sponsors 1 2 13 13 7 3,64 0,728 23 
S40 Open and effective communication between the private and public sector 0 5 12 11 8 3,61 0,722 25 
S11 Standardised PPA 2 3 11 14 6 3,53 0,706 26 
S22 Quality of local equity partners 2 4 11 11 8 3,53 0,706 26 
S15 Financial education about energy infrastructure as an asset class  1 5 13 9 8 3,50 0,700 28 
S34 Ability to export power regionally 3 4 10 11 8 3,47 0,694 29 
S12 Project Size  1 9 8 11 7 3,39 0,678 30 
S17 Reduction of country debt overhang 3 5 12 8 8 3,36 0,672 31 
S16 Government support in the form of sovereign guarantees 4 6 9 8 9 3,33 0,667 32 
S2 Competitive bidding framework 1 10 11 5 9 3,31 0,661 33 
S24 Clear policy on decommissioning of PPAs 1 8 11 11 5 3,31 0,661 33 
S20 Credit rating for Zimbabwe and local companies 1 6 15 11 3 3,25 0,650 35 
S36 Ability of IPPs to lobby government 2 9 12 7 6 3,17 0,633 36 
S19 Project exemptions from tax and duties 2 8 13 11 2 3,08 0,617 37 
S35 Program Champion for IPPS 1 12 13 6 4 3,00 0,600 38 
S21 Further unbundling of the offtaker 3 14 8 7 4 2,86 0,572 39 
S25 Origin of investors (local versus external financiers) 8 11 10 4 3 2,53 0,506 40 
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RANKING OF SUCCESS FACTORS BY SECTOR 
 
 
  Private Public 
Code Critical success factor Mean RII Rank Mean RII Rank 
S33 Upholding of contracts 4,65 0,930 1 4,00 0,800 11 
S5 Expected debt paying ability of project 4,50 0,900 2 4,38 0,875 2 
S31 Operationally efficient and solvent offtaker 4,35 0,870 3 3,63 0,725 26 
S6 Reasonable, fair expected return on equity  4,25 0,850 4 4,19 0,838 6 
S37 Cost of financing (WACC) 4,25 0,850 4 3,69 0,738 24 
S14 Transparent, cost reflective tariff framework  4,20 0,840 6 4,63 0,925 1 
S1 Bankable feasibility study 4,10 0,820 7 4,06 0,813 9 
S29 Coordination between government departments  4,10 0,820 7 3,94 0,788 13 
S4 Experience and competency of the developer 4,00 0,800 9 4,13 0,825 7 
S8 Policy Guarantee Agreement 4,00 0,800 9 3,38 0,675 32 
S18 Credit enhancements (escrow accounts, ring fencing receivables) 3,95 0,790 11 3,50 0,700 29 
S38 Quality of technical partner and high technical performance  3,95 0,790 11 3,69 0,738 24 
S39 Financial innovation and creativity in structuring financing arrangements 3,90 0,780 13 3,75 0,750 21 
S32 Well functioning domestic financial markets and banking system 3,85 0,770 14 4,00 0,800 11 
S3 Stable macro economic policies 3,80 0,760 15 4,25 0,850 4 
S7 Clear policy on land for energy projects  3,80 0,760 15 4,13 0,825 7 
S10 Competent, consistent and fair regulator 3,80 0,760 15 4,38 0,875 2 
S27 Solid risk allocation, management and mitigation plan 3,80 0,760 15 3,81 0,763 19 
S23 Good stakeholder relationship management by project sponsors 3,70 0,740 19 3,56 0,713 28 
S16 Government support in the form of sovereign guarantees 3,65 0,730 20 2,94 0,588 36 
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  Private Public 
Code Critical success factor Mean RII Rank Mean RII Rank 
S28 Experience of financiers with developing country risk 3,65 0,730 20 3,75 0,750 21 
S30 Reasonable licensing and statutory fees 3,65 0,730 20 3,88 0,775 15 
S34 Ability to export power regionally 3,65 0,730 20 3,25 0,650 33 
S13 Comprehensive national energy strategic plan 3,60 0,720 24 4,25 0,850 4 
S36 Ability of IPPs to lobby government 3,60 0,720 24 2,63 0,525 39 
S26 Skilled and experienced advisors  3,55 0,710 26 3,81 0,763 19 
S22 Quality of local equity partners 3,45 0,690 27 3,63 0,725 26 
S9 Technical and financial assistance from DFIs  3,40 0,680 28 3,94 0,788 13 
S19 Project exemptions from tax and duties 3,40 0,680 28 2,69 0,538 38 
S40 Open and effective communication between the private and public sector 3,40 0,680 28 3,88 0,775 15 
S20 Credit rating for Zimbabwe and local companies 3,35 0,670 31 3,13 0,625 34 
S11 Standardised PPA 3,25 0,650 32 3,88 0,775 15 
S17 Reduction of country debt overhang 3,25 0,650 32 3,50 0,700 29 
S15 Financial education about energy infrastructure as an asset class  3,20 0,640 34 3,88 0,775 15 
S24 Clear policy on decommissioning of PPAs 3,15 0,630 35 3,50 0,700 29 
S12 Project Size  3,10 0,620 36 3,75 0,750 21 
S35 Program Champion for IPPS 3,05 0,610 37 2,94 0,588 36 
S21 Further unbundling of the offtaker 2,75 0,550 38 3,00 0,600 35 
S2 Competitive bidding framework 2,70 0,540 39 4,06 0,813 9 
S25 Origin of investors (local versus external financiers) 2,55 0,510 40 2,50 0,500 40 
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KENDALL’S CONCORDANCE TEST 
 
  Private Rank Public Rank 
Kendall's)tau_b) Private)Rank) Correlation Coefficient 1,000 .305** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   ,007 
N 40 40 
Public)Rank) Correlation Coefficient .305** 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,007   
N 40 40 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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